EXHIBITS

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1
                      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                    NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
 2
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                                             Cause No. 3:07CR192
 3
              Plaintiff
                                             Oxford, Mississippi
 4
                                             July 2, 2008
                ν,
                                             9:51 a.m.
 5
   DAVID ZACHARY SCRUGGS
 6
              Defendant
 7
 8
              SENTENCING AS TO COUNT 1 OF THE INFORMATION
                  BEFORE THE HONORABLE NEAL B. BIGGERS
 9
                       U.S. SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE
   APPEARANCES:
10
11
   For the Government:
                             United States Attorney's Office
                             Northern District of Mississippi
12
                             BY: THOMAS W. DAWSON, ESQ.
                             BY: ROBERT H. NORMAN, ESQ.
13
                             900 Jefferson Avenue
                             Oxford, Mississippi 38655-3608
14
   For the Defendant:
                             TODD P. GRAVES, ESQ.
15
                             NATHAN GARRETT, ESQ.
                             Graves, Bartle & Marcus, LLC
16
                             1100 Main Street
                             Suite 2600
17
                             Kansas City, Missouri 64105
                             816-256-3173
18
                             MICHAEL C. MOORE, ESQ.
19
                             Michael Moore Law Firm, LLC
                             10 Canebrake Boulevard, Suite 150
20
                             Post Office Box 321048
                             Flowood, Mississippi 39232
21
   Court Reporter:
                             Rita Davis Sisk
22
                             911 Jackson Avenue, Room 369
                             Oxford, Mississippi 38865
23
                             (662) 281-3027
   Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography, transcript
   produced by computer.
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1
              THE COURT:
                          All right.
                                     The next case on the docket
    is U.S. v. David Zachary Scruggs. Who's with him?
 2
                                                         Are they
 3
   here? (Pause) Come up, gentlemen. All right. Let's get some
   order back there.
 4
                      All right. In this case -- it's Docket No.
 5
   CR192, U.S. v. David Zachary Scruggs.
 6
        Mr. Graves, are you ready to proceed on that?
 7
             MR. GRAVES: We are, Your Honor.
 8
             THE COURT: All right. And who's going to be
   representing -- Mr. Dawson, you're representing the Government?
 9
10
             MR. DAWSON:
                          Yes, sir.
                                      We are.
11
             THE COURT: All right. Let your client come up,
   Mr. Graves.
13
        (Parties complying.)
14
             THE COURT: Mr. Scruggs, on a previous day, you
   entered a plea of guilty to the crime of misprision of a
15
16
   felony.
           You're up before the Court now for sentencing.
17
   there anything you wish to -- before we get into that, I want
   to look at the sentencing guidelines in this case.
18
19
        Mr. Graves, I got your memorandum yesterday that you sent
20
      And you are aware of the guidelines that were set in the
   underlying offense at the previous hearing of the Court.
21
   have filed some comments on those -- some objections to those
22
   guidelines that were set then. Do you want to stand by -- I
   read your objections, read the response from the Government.
25
   Do you want to stand by the record as it stands now before the
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Court, or do you wish to make any comments on any of those
 2
   objections?
 3
              MR. GRAVES: Your Honor, I'm sorry, there was nothing
 4
   new that we hadn't argued before in our memorandum.
 5
   stand on the pleadings as filed.
              THE COURT: All right.
 6
                                      Does the Government agree to
 7
   do that also?
 8
              MR. DAWSON:
                                      We had thought about, late
                          Yes, sir.
   yesterday afternoon, filing a response.
                                             We discussed it with
10
   counsel, and they assured us that there was nothing new in
1.1
   their memorandum that they had not already presented to the
   probation service. And in view of that representation -- and,
12
13
   quite frankly, some technical problems with our ECF -- we
   decided not to file but just to respond as the Court would
14
15
   indicate.
16
             THE COURT:
                         Very well.
                                      All right.
                                                  Then, looking at
   the guidelines as computed by the probation office, the Court
17
   finds in this case that the basic offense level is 12, the
18
   specific offense characteristics are 18, bottom four points;
19
   but they're adjusted down because of the statute to 19 because
   in misprision of a felony the offense level can be no more than
   19. So the Court finds that is the base offense level.
22
23
        To give the defendant credit for adjustment of
24
   responsibility, deducts 3 points; so the total offense level in
2.5
   this case is 16. And the defendant has a criminal history
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1
    category of one.
                      So that will be the guidelines in the case.
    And that calls for a -- with a total offense level of 16 and a
  2
    criminal history category of one, the guideline range of
  3
    imprisonment is 21 to 27 months and a fine of 5,000 to 50,000.
  4
  5
         All right. Now, Mr. Graves, is there anything you wish
    to -- well, I'll ask you first, Mr. Scruggs, is there anything
  6
 7
    you wish to state prior to sentencing?
 8
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor.
 9
              THE COURT:
                         All right.
10
              THE DEFENDANT:
                              I am deeply sorry and regretful for
   my involvement in this case. I wish that I could go back and
11
   change what happened a year ago. And I should have stopped
12
   what happened, and I should have objected to what happened; and
13
   I didn't do that. And that's why I'm here today.
14
                                                        And I -- for
15
   that, I'm deeply sorry and remorseful.
                                           And I ask this Court's
16
   forgiveness.
                And my challenge now is to try to rebuild my
17
   life, Your Honor. Thank you.
18
             THE COURT: All right.
                                     Mr. Graves?
19
             MR. GRAVES:
                          Just two short sentences, Your Honor.
   The defendant spent a great deal of time discussing this, the
20
21
   tragedy that this is for him personally, of his own making.
22
   understands -- he's ashamed beyond what I think he can even
23
   express to the Court, and I think -- I would ask the Court to
24
   take into consideration that the main individual in this case
25
   was this defendant's father and his mentor. And I chink that
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that should be something that the Court considers as it thinks
 2
    about the sentence.
 3
              THE COURT: I usually only hear from one attorney.
 4
   Do you want to say anything, Mr. Moore?
 5
                         Judge, the only thing I will say, because
              MR. MOORE:
   I've known Zach since he was a little boy, what has occurred in
 6
 7
   this case is completely out of character for him.
 8
   counseled with him and worked with him over the last year, and
   I can promise the Court that he is very remorseful and very
   contrite and ashamed, ashamed of what has occurred.
10
11
             THE COURT:
                         Okay. Anything the Government wishes to
12
   add?
13
             MR. DAWSON:
                          If it please the Court, consistent with
14
   the plea agreement that we executed sometime ago prior to the
   defendant's entering a plea to this particular charge, we
16
   agreed that we would recommend to the Court, based on all the
   facts and circumstances, that the defendant receive a probated
1.8
   sentence. We meant that then and we mean that now.
19
   submit that to the Court for its consideration.
20
             THE COURT: All right. Well, as counsel and the
   Government both know, and as the Court pointed out at the plea,
21
   any pleas for leniency by the Government or anyone else are not
23
   binding on the Court. And the Court primarily is bound by the
24
   sentencing guidelines that are the law, regardless of what any
25
   individuals ask for.
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Your case is a sad case, Mr. Scruggs, as your attorney
  1
    eloquently stated. The primary actor in this case was your
    father. It would not have happened without him. And it makes
  3
    it even sadder that you, his son, was brought into it.
  5
         The evidence in this case shows that you were fully aware
    of this corruption -- attempted corruption of Judge Lackey.
  6
    You took that order that Balducci brought up to your law office
  7
    that -- the corrupt order that was attempted to be bought from
 8
   Judge Lackey. And you made comments on it. You said where
 9
   commas should be and what things should be said about it, what
1.0
11
   the order should say.
12
        And based on some of those tapes that you -- that were
   played at the request of your attorney -- or your father's
13
   attorney, Mr. Keker, and which I heard because they were
14
   produced, I just -- it was just clear that you not only knew
1.5
   what was going on, you were participating in what was going on.
   You helped write that order.
18
        You shake your head, Mr. Moore; but I heard the tapes.
                                                                  Не
19
   wrote -- he suggested what should be in that order, that
   corrupted order. Have you heard that?
20
21
             MR. MOORE: Judge, I've listened to every tape,
   interviewed every witness.
22
23
             THE COURT: Well, then, you've heard that if you've
   listened to every cape.
24
25
             MR. MOORE: I did Judge --
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THE COURT:
                         He commented on it.
 2
             MR. MOORE:
                         -- and I hope I get a chance to respond.
 3
             THE COURT: Well, you've had your chance to respond.
   Well, you can respond to that; you can respond to that.
 5
   ahead.
 6
             MR. MOORE: Thank you, Your Honor. Zach Scruggs
   never had any knowledge whatsoever that there was any
   conspiracy to bribe a judge in this case. Zach Scruggs, on
   March 28th, was at a meeting about a --
10
             THE COURT: He's not being sentenced for conspiracy
1.1
   to bribe a judge.
12
             MR. MOORE:
                         I understand, Judge.
             THE COURT: He's being sentenced for misprision of a
13
           But the underlying offense is the corruption of Judge
14
   felony.
15
           He knew that Judge Lackey was being corrupted, and he
16
   had an order there that he was looking at that was part of --
17
   that was an order that was being bought from Judge Lackey -- or
18
   being taken -- persuaded -- at the very least, that he --
   you're saying he knew -- that I know he knew -- was that this
19
   order was the result of a corruption or attempted corruption of
   Judge Lackey.
21
             MR. MOORE:
22
                         Right. Your Honor, I --
23
                        And whether it was for money or whatever
             THE COURT:
24
   else is really immaterial; it was a corrupt order.
25
             MR. MOORE: The only difference -- and I don't want
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to offend the Court. But the only difference is, is that the
   only thing Zach knew was that Tim Balducci went to have a
   conversation with Judge Lackey. He never knew that anybody
   conspired to bribe a judge or to do something untoward.
 5
        The tape that you're talking about is a tape that occurred
   after Tim Balducci came to the Scruggs Law Firm on November the
   1st, wired up, wearing a wire, walked up the stairs, saying he
   was there to meet with two individuals, Sid Backstrom and Dick
   Scruggs.
10
        Zach Scruggs, all the evidence would show, happened to
11
   walk in the room that day. He was never a part of that.
1.2
   that's the only evidence the Government ever had in this case.
1.3
   And that may be a distinction without a difference in Your
14 Honor's mind, but it's a distinction in Zach's mind.
15
             THE COURT: Well, that's something you can arque.
16
   Whether or not that's true remains open. He hasn't pled quilty
17
   to being part of the bribery. And he's not being sentenced for
18
   part of the bribery.
19
       You know, when Mr. Backstrom -- who's admitted he was part
20
   of the bribe -- and your client are as close as they were,
   they're up there in that office every day talking about
   their -- the legal projects of the firm -- and it's hard to --
23 it's kind of a stretch of credulity to believe that Backstrom
  never mentioned that money was being sent down to Judge Lackey.
   You can claim that; you can argue that. And as far as the law
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is concerned, I'm going to base the sentence on that.
   whether or not I believe that is something else.
 2
 3
             MR. MOORE: One thing I'd say, Judge, is -- and I
   know you've listened to some of the tapes, but I've listened to
 4
   all of them. And if the Government has a different view, they
   can say it. With all of the conversations, hundreds of
   conversations, that were wiretapped and taped, there's no
   mention of Zach Scruggs in this case anywhere.
             THE COURT: I understand all of that. That's not
10
   part of this hearing.
11
        What do you say, Mr. Dawson?
12
             MR. DAWSON: I'd have to disagree with that
13
   statement. Mr. Scruggs -- Zach Scruggs is mentioned on some of
   the tapes.
14
15
             THE COURT:
                         That was my recollection also.
  another thing that impressed me negatively about this, frankly,
16
17
   is that when you, Mr. Scruggs, and Mr. Backstrom were talking
1.8
   with Mr. Balducci over this order that he had brought to you
   before it had been entered by Judge Lackey, it was an order
19
   that you were commenting on how it should read and what it
20
   should say -- and you've told me that you have a great respect
21
   and love for the legal field, for the legal profession.
23
   I'm -- I'm not questioning that.
       But you certainly had no great respect for the Circuit
24
  Court of Lafayette County or Indee Lackey, because the tapes
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show that you told Mr. Balducci and Mr. Backstrom that we need
   to hurry up and get this order signed before some other asshole
   gets the case. Now, that's a total thumb in your nose at the
   Lafayette County Circuit Court. And it contradicts your
   statement to the Court that you have a great love and respect
   for the legal profession.
 7
        Based on these considerations, and based on the sentencing
   guidelines that have been furnished the Court, you have no
   criminal history. I'm taking into consideration the
10 Government's plea bargain with you. Of course, I told you when
   the plea bargain was entered into it was not a binding plea
11
12
   agreement.
13
        If, really, the Government and defendants were serious on
   something that would bind the Court to a specific sentence, it
14
   would have been an ll(c)(l)(C) plea agreement like
   Mr. Backstrom had which bound the Court.
17
             MR. MOORE: Your Honor, we were informed by the
18
   Government on that matter -- we asked for a binding plea and
19
   the Government --
20
             THE COURT: You didn't get it. You were here when he
21
   entered a plea of guilty. It was not an ll(c)(l)(C); I told
   you it was not binding.
22
23
             MR. MOORE: Judge, we know that. I just --
             THE COURT: Well, all right. Then, if I want you to
25
   say anymore, Mr. Moore, I'll ask for it.
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MR. MOORE: Judge, I appreciate that. I thought a
   lawyer could always respond to the Court respectfully.
 3
             THE COURT: No, you do not. I didn't ask you to
   respond. I wasn't saying anything to you; I was saying it to
 5
   your client.
 6
             MR. MOORE: I apologize if I've offended the Court in
7
   some way representing my client, Your Honor.
 8
             THE COURT: Well, you know, it's not -- I'm not going
   to argue with you about it, but there's no -- this was never an
10
   11(c)(l)(C) plea agreement.
11
             MR. MOORE: The only response I hope your -- it's
   okay for me to respond now. The only response I have is we
13
   attempted to do a binding plea, and the Government informed us
   that this Court would not accept a binding plea on probation.
14
   And that's why we did not do it that way.
1.5
1.6
             THE COURT:
                        Okay.
                                So it was not an 11(c)(1)(C).
17
             MR, MOORE:
                         That's right, Your Honor.
18
             THE COURT: All right. Then we're in agreement on
19
         But as I was saying, I am giving some weight to the
20
   Government's recommendation for leniency. The quidelines are
21
   from 21 to 27 months. Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of
22
   1984, it is the judgment of the Court that the defendant, David
   Zachary Scruggs, is hereby committed to the custody of the
   Bureau of Prisons to imprisoned for a term of 14 months on
   Count 1 of this charge.
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1
        Upon release from imprisonment, you'll be placed on
   supervised release for a term of one year. The defendant shall
   comply with strict mandatory conditions while he's on
   supervised release.
                       I'm not going to go over all of those at
   this time.
               The probation officer will go over them with you at
   that time. But suffice it to say, Mr. Scruggs, if you violate
 7
   any of them, it means that you'll be back up before the Court
   for additional service.
 8
        It's further ordered that -- the Court has gone below the
10
   guideline range on the imprisonment time. The Court is of the
11
   opinion that the Court should and does hereby depart above the
12
   quideline range to the statutory fine. And the Court has
1.3
   considered the need for the combined sentence to reflect the
14
   seriousness of the offense and to offset the cost of the
15
   Government for the imprisonment and supervision of the
1.6
   defendant, which is estimated at $2,100 a month for
   imprisonment and $1,700 a month for supervision after release.
18
   So the fine in this case will be $250,000.
19
        Now, do you want to report to the institution that's
   designated for your service on your own?
20
21
                         Yes, Your Honor. We'd like to ask for a
             MR. GRAVES:
   report and --
22
23
             MR. MOORE:
                         Judge, we'd respectfully ask the Court in
24
   this case -- I believe the August 4th date was set for the
25
   others. This is probably a bit extraordinary for the Court,
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1 but Mr. Scruggs's wife is pregnant with their third child. The
2 child is due in October. I wondered if the Court would show
3 this defendant mercy enough to allow him to report after his
  child is born.
             THE COURT: You may file a written motion to that
  effect, the Court will consider it.
6
             MR. MOORE: We will, Your Honor. We'd ask -- an
7
   additional request would be -- the fine is $250,000 -- that he
  be given 30 days to pay that fine.
             THE COURT: That'll be granted.
10
             MR. MOORE: Thank you.
11
             THE COURT: All right. So that we'll have some
12
   record that -- Mr. Scruggs, that you want to report on your
14 own -- Ms. Morris -- this will be a statement that you agree to
   do that and that you will -- and it will not be necessary for
15
   the marshals to take you.
17
       (Parties complying.)
             MR. MOORE: Judge, one other request that the other
18
   defendants had -- and we were not prepared to do that today --
19
20 is that we have not given any consideration whatsoever to where
21 Mr. Scruggs would go. And we know that is strictly up to the
22 Bureau of Prisons, but we know that the Court's recommendation
23 sometimes carries some weight. Could I include that in our
   motion on the time to report dua to his wife's pregnancy?
   Could I include a recommendation for your consideration?
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1
             THE COURT: You may include a request for a specific
 2
   institution.
 3
             MR. MOORE: Thank you, sir.
 4
             THE COURT: All right. If there's nothing else, you
 5
   gentlemen may be excused.
 б
             MR. GRAVES: Thank you, Your Honor.
 7
             MR. DAWSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
 8
             THE COURT: All right. The Court's going to be in
   recess for 15 minutes.
10
                  (THE HEARING ENDED AT 10:14 a.m.)
11
                      CERTIFICATION
12
        "I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from
13 the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter, July
   2nd, 2008."
14
                            /s/ Rita Davis Sisk
                            RITA DAVIS SISK, RPR, BCR, CSR #1626
15
                            Official Court Reporter
16
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19
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21
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23
24
25
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	1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI	1 (CALL TO ORDER OF THE COURT)
	2 THE COURT: All right. Gentlemen, yesterday, I think
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Cause No. 3:07CR192	3 we decided that we would start today with the motion to dismiss
Plaintiff . Oxford, Mississippi February 21, 2008	4 Counts 2, 3, and 4. But since this 404(b) material is fresh on
v. 9:30 a.m.	5 all of our minds, we won't have to reiterate it to talk about
RICHARD F. "DICKIE" SCRUGGS	6 that motion. If you gentlemen are ready to go to the 404(b)
DAVID ZACHARY SCRUGGS SIDNEY A. BACKSTROM	7 material, I prefer to do that. If you're not, we can go back
Defendants	8 to the 2, 3, and 4.
	9 MR. KEKER: We're ready, Your Honor.
MOTION HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE NEAL B. BIGGERS	10 MR. NORMAN: We are, Your Honor.
U.S. SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE APPEARANCES:	11 THE COURT: Okay. Well, let's go to the 404(b),
	12 Mr. Keker. Just one second. I saw Mr. Trapp stand up. You
For the Government: United States Attorney's Office Northern District of Mississippi BY: THOMAS W. DAWSON, ESQ. BY: ROBERT H. NORMAN, ESQ.	13 were going to talk on the
BY: THOMAS W. DAWSON, ESQ.	14 MR. TRAPP: I just wanted to say good morning, Your
BY: DAVID A. SANDERS, ÉSQ. 900 Jefferson Avenue	15 Honor. I'm so far down here I wasn't sure if you could see me.
900 Jefferson Avenue Oxford, Mississippi 38655-3608	16 THE COURT: Barely. All right, Mr. Keker.
For the Defendant	17 MR. KEKER: Mr. Trapp's worried (inaudible). The
Richard F. "Dickie" Scruggs:	18 404(b) has two issues, as the Court well knows. I'm not going
JOHN W. KEKER, ESQ. BROOK DOOLEY, ESQ.	19 to talk about the law very much on the first one. But the
JAN NIELSON LITTLE ESO	20 first issue is whether or not the evidence is just there to
TRAVIS LEBLANC, ESQ. WARREN BRAUNIG, ESQ. Keker & Van Nest, LLP	21 show character, bad character, or is there some intent,
/10 Sansome Street	22 motivation, opportunity, plan, scheme; is it relevant to one of
San Francisco, California 94111-1704	23 the enumerated issues of 404(b).
	The second part of 404(b) is equally and maybe more
	25 important; and that is, if you determine that there is some
	2
For the Defendant	1 probative value, does that probative value substantially
David Zachary Scruggs; TODD P. GRAVES, ESQ.	2 outweigh the risks that are basically 403 risks, unfair
NATHAN GARRETT, ESQ.	3 prejudice, confusion of the issues, causing to delay in the
Graves, Bartle & Marcus, LLC 1100 Main Street	4 trial.
Suite 2600 Kansas City, Missouri 64105	5 We believe that this evidence about Wilson v. Scruggs,
816-256-3173	6 which is a case that was before a lot of judges from 1994 on,
For the Defendant Sydney A. Backstrom:	7 but among them was Judge DeLaughter in Hinds County, meets
Of the y A. Backston,	
FRANK W. TRAPP, ESQ.	8 both – does not meet either one of these tests. At most, it's
JAMES W. CRAIG, ESQ.	
JAMES W. CRAIG, ESQ. Phelps Dunbar 111 East Capitol Street, Suite 600	8 both – does not meet either one of these tests. At most, it's
JAMES W. CRAIG, ESQ. Phelps Dunbar 111 East Capitol Street, Suite 600 Post Office Box 23066	 8 both – does not meet either one of these tests. At most, it's 9 character evidence; and second, it's it would lead to a lot
JAMES W. CRAIG, ESQ. Phelps Dunbar 111 East Capitol Street, Suite 600 Post Office Box 23066 Jackson, Mississippi 39225-3066 601-352-2300	 8 both – does not meet either one of these tests. At most, it's 9 character evidence; and second, it's it would lead to a lot 10 of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, and so on. And l
JAMES W. CRAIG, ESQ. Phelps Dunbar 111 East Capitol Street, Suite 600 Post Office Box 23066 Jackson, Mississippi 39225-3066	 both – does not meet either one of these tests. At most, it's character evidence; and second, it's it would lead to a lot of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, and so on. And I think you got a taste of this yesterday.
JAMES W. CRAIG, ESQ. Phelps Dunbar 111 East Capitol Street, Suite 600 Post Office Box 23066 Jackson, Mississippi 39225-3066 601-352-2300 J. RHEA TANNEHILL, JR., ESQ. Tannehill & Carmean, PLLC 400 South Lamar Boulevard, Suite C	 both – does not meet either one of these tests. At most, it's character evidence; and second, it's – it would lead to a lot of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, and so on. And I think you got a taste of this yesterday. I'm not about to talk to you about what the law in this
JAMES W. CRAIG, ESQ. Phelps Dunbar 111 East Capitol Street, Suite 600 Post Office Box 23066 Jackson, Mississippi 39225-3066 601-352-2300 J. RHEA TANNEHILL, JR., ESQ. Tannehill & Carmean, PLLC 400 South Lamar Boulevard, Suite C Post Office Box 1383 Oxford, Mississippi 38655	 both – does not meet either one of these tests. At most, it's character evidence; and second, it's it would lead to a lot of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, and so on. And I think you got a taste of this yesterday. I'm not about to talk to you about what the law in this area is because you know it very well. You got a taste for
JAMES W. CRAIG, ESQ. Phelps Dunbar 111 East Capitol Street, Suite 600 Post Office Box 23066 Jackson, Mississippi 39225-3066 601-352-2300 J. RHEA TANNEHILL, JR., ESQ. Tannehill & Carmean, PLLC 400 South Lamar Boulevard, Suite C Post Office Box 1383	 both – does not meet either one of these tests. At most, it's character evidence; and second, it's it would lead to a lot of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, and so on. And I think you got a taste of this yesterday. I'm not about to talk to you about what the law in this area is because you know it very well. You got a taste for Balducci. Balducci says in response Mr. Balducci says in
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5 7 But I believe -- he offered him a federal judgeship? No. he 1 1 rulings to Mr. Scruggs. And indeed, the summary judgment 2 didn't offer him a federal judgeship. He offered to try to get 2 motion in that case was denied. Other motions were denied. I can show them to you if you want to. The case went to trial. 3 him on a list for a federal judgeship. Well, okay. That's 3 4 very interesting. 4 When the case went to trial, Judge DeLaughter had been trying 5 What was Judge DeLaughter suppose to do? Vague -- I mean, 5 to get that case settled for a long time, as any decent judge 6 I'm not sure what Judge DeLaughter was suppose to do. He 6 would have. 7 certainly -- and that case didn't involve money. Mr. Langston 7 And after the case was in trial, it finally did settle; 8 has said, in front of all the lawyers here, in front of them, I 8 and this whole dispute between Mr. Wilson and the Scruggs firm 9 believe; over and over again, that he knows of no 9 ended up with Mr. Wilson getting close to \$4 million as you 10 money that ever went towards Judge DeLaughter. 10 heard yesterday, not as much as he wanted but not a goose egg. 11 THE COURT: You say Mr. Langston? 11 Every decision in that case -- and I challenge them to point to 12 MR. KEKER: Mr. Langston is the person who --12 one decision that -- that this doesn't fit - was correct on 13 THE COURT: I know who he is, but I don't know where 13 the law. You read those -- order after order after order. he -- how do you know what he said to him? 14 14 they're right; they make sense. 15 MR. KEKER: Here's how we know, because when he 15 Judge DeLaughter did what was apparently an excellent job. 16 entered his plea before Judge Mills, here's what happened: He 16 He made the decisions that any good judge would have made; it 17 was representing Mr. Scruggs. Mr. Zach Scruggs' lawyer, 17 was a contract case. The thing of value in that case, 18 Mr. Farese, at some point while this case was pending, took 18 Mr. Scruggs doesn't appoint judges. Senator Lott, Senator 19 Mr. Langston, Mr. Scruggs' lawyer. So this is Mr. Zach 19 Cochran don't appoint judges. No one knows of any 20 Scruggs's lawyer takes Dick Scruggs' lawyer into the Government 20 recommendation that Mr. Scruggs has ever made for a judgeship 21 and they make a deal for Mr. Langston. that has been accepted as a recommendation from a senator. 21 22 And Mr. Langston gets -- and goes to Judge Mills, not to 22 These senators and Mr. Scruggs are from different 23 you, and they make a -- they put a lid on it, and he is now 23 political wings. Judge DeLaughter, as I understand it, is a 24 cleared for all crimes, known and unknown, according to his 24 democrat. So -- and again, it's the White House that appoints 25 plea agreement. And he is the witness -- and we have no idea 25 judges, not the senators. 8 1 what was motivating Mr. Langston --1 And then, what judgeships are they talking about? There 2 THE COURT: I think the plea agreement said related 2 were three during this period, and I think it's worth noting. 3 and unrelated 3 Judge Lee went senior in April. Judge Jordan, two weeks later, 4 MR. KEKER: Beg your pardon. Beg your pardon. 4 was appointed to take his position. Judge Barbour went senior 5 Related and unrelated. But all -- as I understand it, all 5 in February of 2006. Judge Southwick was appointed in June, 6 crimes. And we expect the Government to call - and when they 6 before the trial of this Wilson v. Scruggs case. 7 gave us 404(b) notice, they said "good and sufficient notice is 7 THE COURT: Southwick was to the circuit 8 for you to go read his allocution of the plea where Mr. Dawson 8 MR. KEKER: Okay. Then I got that wrong. I thought 9 described what the offense was." And he said that the offense 9 that Southwick -- Judge Barbour's position was filled by 10 was from December of 2006 until March of 2007 there was a 10 somebody, and I've got it wrong. I'm not sure who it --11 conspiracy to influence Judge DeLaughter by promising him to 11 THE COURT: I'm not sure it's ever been filled. 12 recommend -- get him on a list or something for a federal 12 MR. KEKER: Oh, I'd understood -- we've got some --13 judgeship. And in return, they were going to get favorable 13 he was announced as a circuit court judge. Is he the one that 14 14 replaced Judge Pickering when that didn't work out? 15 Now, there's a lot of things that are interesting about 15 THE COURT: Yes. 16 that and a lot of things that I think you need to consider as 16 MR. KEKER: I think that's right. So there was an 17 you go forward and think about whether or not this evidence is 17 announcement in June that Southwick was taking Judge Barbour's 18 going to make the trial of this indictment a fair one. First 18 place in the district court and -- or at least was nominated 19 of all, let's just start with Mr. Scruggs strongly denies any 19 for that; and then, apparently, they changed and put him on the kind of bribe or corruption in the Wilson v. Scruggs case, 20 Fifth Circuit. 20

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still open, isn't it?

THE COURT: Well, Barbour's position, I think, is

MR. KEKER: And that's what Mr. LeBlanc was just

telling me. And then Judge Bramlette announced senior status

in March of that year and Judge Ozerden in September was

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show that there wasn't any

doesn't know of any; and we believe that this minitrial would

talking about. There were some favorable rulings to

Mr. Scruggs; but most importantly, there were unfavorable

The issue of favorable rulings, we don't know what they're

9 appointed to that position. But - so whatever the vacancies action, but he'd been in this case since at least 2004. The 2 were, they were all filled during the time that the Government 2 case was in Federal Court in the Southern District of Mississippi. Judge Lee stayed it so that state court action 3 alleges this conspiracy happened. And this -- the notion of a 3 4 quid pro quo just sort of doesn't line up, doesn't make any 4 could proceed for sort of an accounting action, and then there 5 5 was more to do in federal court. He'd been involved in it for 6 The Judge Ozerden position, by the way, was always 6 a long time. He wasn't a newcomer to the case. 7 designated - or people, at least, understood that it was 7 Another reason of unfairness which we don't -- we haven't 8 probably going to go to a south Mississippi, south coast 8 played out yet is that there's various privileges involved here 9 person. 9 that may be invoked and may make it difficult for us to get all 10 10 the evidence that we need to counter whatever it is If the issue is whether or not there's anything criminal 11 or wrong or even unusual about Mississippi lawyers or 11 Mr. Langston feels like saying. California lawyers or any other state lawyers recommending to 12 12 And I just raise -- I asked the Government if they would 13 people that they know a good judge for a federal judgeship, 13 accommodate us by getting witnesses that I believe were under 14 whether or not they have cases pending before them, then we'll 14 their control to the hearing. And they informed me -- and they 15 have to try that issue. 15 very graciously did that. Mr. Langston is available if you 16 Because we know that some of the most - I mean, one 16 want to hear from him. But I asked about Mr. Ed Peters, who is 17 particularly, highly, highly respected lawyer in Jackson was 17 the local formal D.A., local lawyer in Hinds County that was 18 18 hired. recommending Judge DeLaughter to Senator Lott at the same time; 19 and this lawyer happened to have in his office many cases 19 And, again, if it's a crime to hire -- if the charges that 20 before Judge DeLaughter. People who don't have cases before a 20 they were worried about getting hometowned in Hinds County, 21 judge could look forward to having cases before a judge. 21 then that's true; they were worried about it. Judge 22 People who don't have cases now maybe had cases in the past and 22 DeLaughter's former law clerk was on the other side, was -- had 23 so on. Recommending a good judge to the federal bench is not a good relations with Judge DeLaughter, was advising the lawyers, 24 24 Mr. Merkel and others, about how to litigate that side of the 25 So the point is, to get through this, to get the experts 25 case. 10 12 1 to talk about what this case was about, how Judge DeLaughter 1 Mr. Scruggs side of the case, through Joey Langston, hired 2 ruled, what happened when, what work the lawyers did, would 2 Mr. Ed Peters, who was also both a friend, former boss, 3 really swamp the case that the indictment is about and has 3 professional colleague of Judge DeLaughter, had a lot of cases 4 very, very little to do with it. 4 before him. Still has a lot of cases before him I believe. 5 It is unfair -- let me start out with, the most huge 5 But that's what it was. I don't think that's - certainly, 6 unfairness here is for the defendant Zach Scruggs and Sid 6 it's not a crime. It's not unusual. And it doesn't lead to 7 Backstrom. It's my understanding that the Government doesn't 7 the charge here. 8 contend, at least hasn't so far, that the evidence is 8 So what we've learned when we asked for Ed Peters to come 9 9 admissible or relevant as to either of them. here is that they informed us that his lawyer said he might 10 So this would be one of those deals where they would 10 take the Fifth. I don't know. We'll still try. Judge suggest to you that we try the case for a week; we work very 11 11 DeLaughter, I don't know what the situation is going to be 12 hard to understand Wilson v. Scruggs; we talk about all these 12 there. 13 orders; we call experts; and then your instruction to the jury 13 I do know that both Senators Lott and Cochran, who we 14 that they should just ignore this evidence when it comes to 14 understand make these recommendations by consensus, not by one 15 considering the cases of Dick Scruggs' son and his partner, 15 person deciding things, have speech and debate clause with the 16 Mr. Backstrom. 16 United States Constitution privileges, which they may or may 17 I mean, it's just not going to work, Your Honor; and I 17 not assert; I just don't know. But they certainly are 18 think a judge of your experience can evaluate that, obviously, 18 important witnesses. 19 for yourself. It's unfair to Dick Scruggs. If the Government 19 This gives us about a month if you decide to let this in. 20 wants to bring this case as a separate charge, I guess they 20 We've got to go out and get experts to study this file and come 21 will do it. There's nothing anybody can do about that. But 21 in and testify about the fact that these were good, honest, 22 the idea that Langston, who was the counsel of record in Wilson 22 true, supported by law, fair, proper rulings. That's going to 23 v. Scruggs -- they say that he just popped on the scene in, I 23 take a lot of time 24 think, January and filed an appearance, January of 2006. 24 And then another unpleasant loose end is the one I already 25 He was -- he filed an appearance in the Hinds County 25 mentioned. The idea that Mr. Zach Scruggs' lawyer thought that

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13 15 it was okay to take Mr. Dick Scruggs' lawyer into the 1 1 of evidence so that it would be well within your power, and in 2 Government and insist that these are really separate matters; 2 this case would make a lot of sense, to have a Rule 104 of the 3 therefore, he doesn't have a conflict, is something I suppose 3 Federal Rules of Evidence hearing where a trial judge can 4 we'd have to get into. 4 insist on a proffer, and the proffer can come in whatever form. 5 5 So -- I don't know what to say about -- I mean, I can It can come from the Government; it can come from the 6 argue it more legally. But this really does sound like one of 6 witness. But before Mr. Langston -- and I am not talking about 7 those instances where a trial judge, using his discretion, has 7 Jencks Act. Before he gets up and talks to a jury who's 8 to decide -- maybe to put it -- put it to the Government. I 8 supposed to be trying this case about Judge Lackey getting a 9 mean, if the Government says that they want to prosecute 9 cash bribe in this case, that we all know about, and 10 Mr. Dick Scruggs for this and call it a crime, then we ought to 10 Mr. Langston completely clutters it up with these allegations, do it all at once. We'll try that case. But it won't be with 11 11 which are far afield and we don't believe have any probative 12 Sid and Zach because they're not -- under 8(b), they couldn't 12 value, but to the extent that they -- that you think otherwise, 13 be joined to that case. 13 we're just off on a frolic and a detour and a whole other case. 14 And I guess the basic question is, If the Government 14 And then afterwards you think. Gee -- and then we stand up 15 thinks they have a case that they can prove beyond a reasonable 15 after Mr. Langston testifies and say, We need the Jencks Act 16 doubt; they went to the grand jury, they brought it back; 16 material, and we need a continuance, and we need all this stuff 17 you've heard a lot about it, why shouldn't they just go ahead 17 to counter these allegations. We've got a real trial problem 18 and do that and not, basically, divert the jury into some other 18 on our hands, and we will try to avoid it. But one way to deal 19 direction? 19 with it is to put Mr. Langston up and make a good firm decision 20 I believe that if you're thinking about this it would be 20 now after you listen to him, that I don't want to get into this 21 very useful for you to hear from Mr. Langston, not for a long 21 in this trial. 22 time, but -- and from Mr. Peters, too, about what the contours 22 If the Government thinks this is a crime, they have a way 23 of this allegation are so that you can decide whether or not it 23 to deal with it; they can bring a charge. If they just want to 24 makes any sense to try them as 404(b) in this case. And we 24 kind of use it to clutter up this case, then we're not going to 25 would ask you to do that. We'd ask for a hearing where I can 25 let them do that. That's where we think you ought to come out. 14 16 1 examine Mr. Langston about some of these matters for a little And then, as I said, they're about to argue their 1 2 while, whatever time limit you want to put on it. 2 severance motion. But it seems to me that they haven't over --3 THE COURT: All right. Now, you know, Mr. Keker, the 3 I mean, we can talk about limiting instructions to the jury all 4 Court's not going to give you a license to compete with Marco 4 we want. But those of us who have tried cases for a long time 5 Polo for a fishing expedition, as we got into yesterday almost. 5 know there are certain kinds of things that can't be overcome 6 6 And I'm not sure that 404(b) entitles you to anything more than by limiting instructions. 7 reasonable notice by the prosecution of what -- of the 7 THE COURT: All right. As I understand the 8 substance, the gist, of what they intend to prove, if it's 8 Government's position at this point -- I'll like to hear what 9 allowed, in a 404(b)-type testimony. 9 they have to say about it -- they would contend -- I'm drawing 10 So the fact -- there is law to the effect, previous 10 this conclusion from their brief that they filed in opposition to your motion to disallow 404(b), that they intend to offer 11 similar cases, that the -- that this notice requirement of 11 12 404(b) does not supersede the Jencks Act, which limits you to 12 this for the purpose of proving intent. That's as I understand 13 your discovery, as you know. I'm not even sure you're entitled 13 their position at this time. 14 to know what Mr. Langston is going to say until after he 14 Now, 404(b) also allows testimony of previous bad acts to 15 testifies on direct 15 prove absence of mistake or misunderstanding, as you know. 16 Of course, they can give you the substance of what he says 16 Now, if Mr. Scruggs got on the stand and said, Well, this is a 17 if they're ordered to, you know, earlier than that, like 17 mistake, I gave -- this is a mistake. Mr. Balducci and I 18 they've done on these other witnesses. But I want to hear what 18 misunderstood each other. The money that I gave him -- I did 19 the Government has to say about Mr. Langston being called to 19 not understand it was to be for -- to bribe Judge Lackey. I 20 testify in this case, in this hearing. 20 was giving it to him for some work he had done for me, and it

Now, would that 404(b) evidence of Mr. Langston also be

MR. KEKER: I think the Government would argue at

available to show the absence of a mistake, if that defense

was all a mistake

were put on by you?

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MR. KEKER: Could I respond just real briefly?

not some right -- what we're saying is there's - I think I

MR. KEKER: The purpose of putting Mr. Langston on is

said enough and you know enough about the dangers of this kind

THE COURT: Yes

17 1 that point something diff -- they wouldn't argue 404(b); they'd 1 Your Honor, in the Wilson case, Mr. Langston and 2 argue impeachment. I mean -- or - and they might to the 2 Mr. Balducci came into that case when it became clear that 3 extent that they did, but that's not the situation that we 3 Mr. Dunbar wasn't being as successful as Mr. Scruggs would 4 have. The situation that we have -- I mean, I can see 4 like. And Bobby DeLaughter, sitting on the bench, had a best 5 Mr. Scruggs testimony opening the door to various things that 5 friend, a best friend in the world; he'd worked for as an 6 otherwise might not be admissible in this trial. 6 assistant DA, when he tried the cases that they've made movies 7 But I can also see it not opening the door, and it's 7 about. That boss, of course, as everybody knows, was Ed 8 not -- we don't know whether Mr. Scruggs is going to testify or 8 Peters. And it was common knowledge that the two were tight, 9 not. It depends on what the Government does. What we're 9 The brief testimony of Joey Langston would be that they 10 talking about now and what I'm moving to exclude is use in the 10 hired Bobby DeLaughter. And at first, we heard they hired him 11 case in chief of this information as required by 404(b). And I 11 as a consultant --12 think that's a much different -- and really, I guess I should 12 THE COURT: You mean Ed Peters. 13 make that clear. 13 MR. NORMAN: Ed Peters, I'm sorry. No money went to 14 We're not asking you to make a decision about what 14 Bobby DeLaughter. They hired Ed Peters to be a consultant. evidence can come in on cross-examination. We may ask you to 15 15 What struck me first was, That makes no sense. Ed Peters has 16 make that decision during the trial or something before we put 16 been a prosecutor, like me, for 30 years. Like me, he knows 17 Mr. Scruggs on but -- and try to get advanced rulings. But 17 nothing about civil litigation. Why pay him a million dollars 18 we're not asking for that now. We're asking for, Should this 18 to bring him in to advise sophisticated civil lawyers on how to 19 come in, in the Government's case in chief? 19 try civil cases? That's absurd. 20 THE COURT: Okay, Lunderstand, Mr. Norman, 20 They brought him in -- as Joey Langston would testify, 21 MR. NORMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. We spent 21 they brought him in and paid him a million dollars, \$50,000 22 yesterday hearing that Mr. Scruggs had no criminal intent. I 22 cash, followed by monthly payments making up a million dollars 23 took that as the gist of the motion to dismiss yesterday, that to corruptly influence his best friend, Bobby DeLaughter. And 24 the Government had created some crime, that Mr. Scruggs had no 24 then, to be sure, they dangled a federal judgeship in front of

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arguing the 404(b) that goes directly to that point.

Your Honor, I'd like to talk first about the Wilson case and then talk about why I believe its relevance outweighs its

intention of violating the law. And now we stand before you

prejudicial value. Wilson is interesting in several respects.

First, what strikes me about this case, unlike most cases we 5

try in this courtroom, these aren't unsophisticated people.

7 These are extremely sophisticated lawyers at the top of their 8

game, at the top of their trade.

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There was no effort to get Bobby DeLaughter to break the law. There was no effort to get Bobby DeLaughter to rule in violation of the law. That would have been foolish, and these men are smart. What they wanted Bobby DeLaughter to do was shade the law at every opportunity, to ensure a victory they probably would have anyway. And that's an irony that's interesting in both these cases, both in the matter involving

16 Judge Lackey and in the matter involving Mr. Wilson.

There is every reason to believe that the Scruggs Law Firm probably would have prevailed in both those cases. The strange

19 part about this is that wasn't good enough. They had to have

20 an edge. And that resulted in efforts to corrupt judges free,

if possible, because these are businessmen. They know the 21

22 value of a dollar. Free, if possible.

But if it was necessary to pay, they were willing to do that. Not only because of the \$30 million at stake, the \$26.5 million at stake, but also because of the status involved.

25 him

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Now, everybody in this courtroom knows Mr. Scruggs doesn't

2 have the ability himself to do that. But he has the

3 connections to the senator. Counsel opposite would argue that

4 the senator does not appoint judges. And everyone in this

5 courtroom knows that, best of all, Your Honor, But Your Honor

6 also knows how valuable it is to have a senator put you on the 7

list. And that's what happened.

8 And Joey Langston would say they made sure Bobby

9 DeLaughter knew they caused that to happen. And they did it in

10 the middle of trial when it was critical. Did Bobby DeLaughter

violate the law -

12 THE COURT: What do you mean they did it in the

13 middle of the trial?

14 MR. NORMAN: As the case was pending and approaching

15 its completion, after, I think, ten years of litigation - this

16 happened in March when the case was settling -- going to trial

17 and then settling in the summer of 2006. As Joey Langston and

18 Tim Balducci took over the representation of the Scruggs Law

19 Firm, commencing some time, I think, in the fall of 2005 but

20 really getting hot in December 2006 and culminating in August

21 of 2006 when the matter settled.

22 By the time the matter got to trial, the judges' rulings

23 had whittled away at the plaintiffs case to the point where

24 Bobby DeLaughter said from the bench to counsel for both sides,

"I don't know why you want to try this case, nothing's left but

25

21 23 1 bragging rights." And he was right. the defendants, as far as expanding the length of the trial; 1 2 It is true that there was a judgment against the Scruggs 2 and what would be the -- what would you have to prove in order 3 Law Firm. But it's important to know it was a victory for them 3 to prove that this action, alleged action, by Mr. Scruggs was a 4 because they paid no new money. That's what they'd already 4 similar crime? Would you have to prove the same elements that 5 paid Wilson. They, in effect, won on the merits. 5 you have in this case, that you have to prove in this case? Or 6 And they did that not by asking Bobby DeLaughter to 6 would it just be that Mr. Langston said it happened and that's 7 actually break the law --7 it? 8 THE COURT: I don't know. You still haven't 8 MR. NORMAN: First, Your Honor, I think it's 9 explained my question. What do you mean in the middle of the 9 important to start by saying that the evidence of extrinsic 10 trial? 10 acts doesn't have to be a crime at all. Simple bad acts are 11 MR. NORMAN: In the middle of the pendency of the 11 sufficient if they're relevant. However, in this case, it was 12 case, I should have said, Your Honor, not in the actual trial 12 a crime; and that's part of the similarity between the two 13 of the case, the pendency of the case. I'm sorry. 13 offenses. The standard of proof that we must use, Beechum Your Honor, the testimony would be brief from says, "This Court should determine, before admitting that 14 14 15 Mr. Balducci, about what you heard yesterday. The testimony at 15 evidence, that a reasonable jury could find on that evidence 16 trial from Mr. Langston would be brief, about what you've heard 16 that the extrinsic acts actually occurred." 17 from me this morning. That testimony would also implicate Zach 17 THE COURT: All right. But would you have to prove, 18 Scruggs. Joey Langston is prepared to testify that Zach 18 for example, the Title 18, 666, material that you have to prove 19 Scruggs was fully aware of what was going on in the Wilson 19 in this case? 20 20 case. It will not implicate Sid Backstrom. MR. NORMAN: No, Your Honor. Because of the fact 21 However, the Peterson case stands for the proposition that 21 that all is required is bad acts. We believe that crime 22 if 404(b) evidence is admissible against a defendant, then with 22 occurred, but we don't have to prove that. We have to prove 23 a proper limiting instruction, it is admissible in the case in 23 that a bad act occurred that is relevant to something other 24 chief. Now, as we all know, this Court has complete discretion 24 than general character in this case. 25 in this matter; and in the event the Court decides to allow 25 Now, counsel opposite also brought up privileges. I don't 22 24 1 this evidence, it could be in the case in chief or it could be 1 know if the Court wants me to address that or not, but I'd like 2 in rebuttal 2 to. Because I'd like for the Court to know that when 3 I'd like to address that point very briefly, without 3 Mr. Farese brought Mr. Langston in to plead guilty to this 4 citing a case from another circuit that I cited in my brief, 4 offense of attempting to bribe a judge in the Southern 5 because I don't think the Court will find that particularly 5 District, attempting to corruptly influence that judge, he 6 persuasive 6 obtained written waivers from both, both Mr. Zach Scruggs and 7 But as you know, Your Honor, the Beechum test is that, 7 Mr. Langston, before doing that. And I've not seen them. I 8 first, this extrinsic evidence must be relevant to a question 8 haven't asked to. I haven't cross-examined him, but I'm sure 9 that's critical to the trial of our case. And second, the 9 they're available if need be. 10 probative value has to outweigh the prejudicial effect, where 10 Your Honor, as far as a privilege, any attorney/client 11 the intent involved in the extrinsic acts is the very same 11 privilege goes, as the Court well knows, if a lawyer and his 12 intent that's alleged and that must be proven by the Government 12 client are involved in a crime together, there is no privilege. 13 in this case. The Beechum decision stands for the proposition. 13 Now, we don't anticipate any executive privilege on the part of 14 That, in and of itself, satisfies the relevancy prong of the 14 a senator. I don't believe you're going to see that as a 15 Beechum test. Obviously, the Court still has to make that 15 problem. So I don't see that privilege will be an issue. 16 determination; and that's discretionary with the Court. 16 What kind of notice are they required to have? 17 Then the question is, Is it overly prejudicial? And the 17 THE COURT: Okay. You don't need to go into that. 18 Beechum court suggested that we consider the similarity of 18 I've looked at that in your briefs. But who would you 19 these two, the extrinsic offense and the charged offense, in 19 anticipate calling if this type material were allowed into 20 making the decision whether or not the probative value 20 evidence, what witnesses? 21 outweighs the prejudicial effect. What are the similarities? 21 MR. NORMAN: Your Honor, we'd already have Tim 22 First, these two offenses both involved --22 Balducci on the stand; and I would ask him, basically, what I 23 THE COURT: Okay. I think -- I understand the 23 asked him yesterday. That would probably be the first time 24 similarities from what was said yesterday. But what is your 24 this issue would be before the Court for your determination. 25 position on the extent of discovery that would be available to 25 Secondly, we would call Joey Langston. And his testimony, I

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1	believe I could the direct examination, I could do in five	1	good judge.	
2	minutes. We would call Senator Lott, and I believe his	2	When you get into this file and find out what this case is	
3	testimony would be short, sir.	3	about, it was decided before Judge DeLaughter even got ahold	
4	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.	4	of it, it was decided that the contract between Mr. Scruggs and	
5	MR. KEKER: Could I respond to some of that?	5	Mr. Wilson was clear and unambiguous; and we're not going to	
6	THE COURT: Yes, you may.	6	have parole evidence; and your rights depend on the word	
7	MR. KEKER: Let me start I think the goal posts	7	existing and the word is.	
8	are moving a little bit here. They're not going to prove a	8	It's one of those trials about what does is mean? And	
9	crime; they're going to prove a, quote, bad act. And I'm now	9	Judge DeLaughter wrote an opinion saying, "Is is what it is,	
10	not sure what the bad act is. It's not bribing Judge	10	and existing means existing." And what he told these people	
11	DeLaughter; it's not paying him to influence any opinion. It's	11	is, "I'm strictly construing the contract and that leads to	
12	paying him to shade the law? What law was there was no law	12	simply an accounting."	
13	shaded.	13	And when the accounting was all done, it turned out that	
14	They're going to prove that Ed Peters, who was a friend of	14	the \$6 million that Mr. Scruggs had paid Mr. Wilson was enough,	
15	the judge and a former boss and a person who has many cases	15	so that Mr. Wilson wasn't owed more money. And at that point,	
16	before him and does a lot of work before him and is a person	16	when Mr. Wilson figured that out and figured that he was -	
17	that lots of lawyers in this state hire as local counsel when	17	that's what the bragging rights is about. But this case went	
18	they go down to Hinds County because he knows he's part of	18	to trial, summary judgment was denied, a lot of money changed	
19	the courthouse crowd, to balance Mr. Kirksey, the judge's	19	hands in Mr. Wilson's favor. It was a fair and fully litigated	
20	former law partner, who's there for the same reason	20	thing.	
21	Mr. Merkel's got him.	21	Mr. Langston and I think we'll bring this out, and I	
22	We are going to try that and try to explain to this jury	22	think Mr. Langston's got enough ego that he'll probably admit	
23	that, you know, that's not really - that's kind of maybe	23	this did a heck of a job. He took advantage of a foolish	
24	it's the way things are done. Maybe you like it; maybe you	24	effort by Mr. Wilson's lawyers to say to the judge, we want	
25	don't like it. But it doesn't have anything to do, ladies and	25	we want you to determine under this existing what is due	
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1	gentlemen, with the charge that's before you.	1	under the contract. And once that was determined, it turned	
2	But we're going to spend a lot of time trying that because	2	out that Mr. Scruggs had paid, by the \$6 million, enough money	
3	what they're — they aren't willing to say it's a crime.	3	to cover all of the claims that Mr that Mr. Wilson had.	
4	They're not willing if they think it's a crime, then they	4	So all of that is going to have to be litigated. And at	
5	can carry out their professional responsibilities and deal with	5	the end of it, the jury and, I think, you are going to be left	
6	it. They have grand jury power. But – so, first of all, that	6	scratching your heads thinking, What has this got to do with,	
7	concerns me.	7	and haven't we really gone way away from the things that the	
8	And then second of all, the idea that they are going to	8	jurors are sworn to do, which is make a decision about the	
10	call Tim Balducci, who has some hearsay, and Joey Langston, who	9	charges in this indictment.	
11	has his deal and whatever he's going to say about this, and	10	He says that this shows intent. I don't see the intent at	
12	that that's going to be the end of it; and that we're just	11	all the same. Mr. Balducci, at the behest of Judge Lackey,	
13	suppose to sit there and cross-examine them for five minutes after they testify for five minutes, is not on any planet that	12	said, Okay, I'll bribe you. And the question in that case is	
14	I'm knowledgeable about.	13	whether or not Mr I mean, various cases whether or not	
15	We want to call they just in this presentation,	14	Mr. Scruggs joined that conspiracy, and so on.	-
16	there's a lot of people who have been accused of a lot of	15	But nobody contends that a bribe to Judge Lackey for an	
17	nastiness. And if nothing else, they ought to have the right	16	order is some kind of I mean, is okay. It's clearly a	1
18	to come forward and say the way they see it. Mr. Peters, if we	17	corrupt act. The jury is going to understand that. And the	1
19	can get him on the stand, we'll put him on the stand. Judge	18	question is, Who was responsible for it? And, so, whatever the	
20	DeLaughter, if we can get him on the stand, we'll put them on	20	intent is in that case, they have to nobody's going to	
21	the stand. Senators Lott and Cochran, we want them both.	21	wonder whether or not if you knowingly are making a cash bribe to a judge you have that kind of intent.	
22	And then we want the lawyers in Jackson who have cases	22	Over here, what they are going to have to do is figure	
23	pending before Judge DeLaughter, like Joey Langston, who are	23	out, Is there anything wrong? And now we're getting – is it a	
24			ode to more drifting wrong: And how were getting - is it a	ĺ
1 -	recommending Judge DeLaughter as a federal judge because they	24	bad act to hire Mr. Peters? And this million dollars, by the	I
25	recommending Judge DeLaughter as a federal judge because they think he's a good judge. A lot of people think he's a very	24 25	bad act to hire Mr. Peters? And this million dollars, by the	
25	recommending Judge DeLaughter as a federal judge because they think he's a good judge. A lot of people think he's a very	24 25	bad act to hire Mr. Peters? And this million dollars, by the way, Your Honor, this they've said in their proffer there	

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1	was a reverse contingency fee. If you guys do better than X,	1	Court is fully advised at this point of what the evidence is	
2	you get some money. And they did better than X, and they got	2	that the Government wishes to introduce under 404(b), fully	
3	some money. It wasn't, up front, here's a million dollars to	3	apprised sufficiently to rule on this motion. I do not feel at	
4	go do something.	4	this time that there's that any testimony by any witness	
5	So I think, just this discussion, is kind of getting	5	would be productive or would add anything that's necessary to	
6	now they say before they didn't say; but now, I guess, they	6	be known to the Court before ruling on it.	
7	say that Mr. Zach Scruggs I don't thoroughly understand.	7	The Court wants to take this motion under advisement and	
8	But, clearly, Mr. Backstrom is not involved in this and is	8	read a couple of cases that have been presented to me in your	
9	not involved in these allegations. And the idea that he has to	9	briefs again before ruling. And the Court will take this	
10	sit through this is a big problem.	10	motion of 404(b) under advisement and rule on it within a few	
11	So this keeps moving. I mean, we now know here's what	11	days.	
12	you know, the similar act, it was not an effort to get Judge	12	All right. Who is going to represent the defendants on	
13	DeLaughter to violate the law. It was not an effort it was	13	the dismissal of Counts 2, 3, and 4?	
14	not involving any money to Judge DeLaughter or anything of	14	MS. LITTLE: Your Honor, I will. I'm Jan Little from	
15	value, except that at some point - oh, and you asked about	15	Keker & Van Nest.	
16	chronology. Let me make sure that this is straight because	16	THE COURT: All right, Ms. Little.	
17	we've gotten some discovery on this.	17	MS. LITTLE: Thank you. Good morning, Your Honor.	
18	Senator Lott called Judge DeLaughter on about March 29th.	18	THE COURT: Good morning.	
19	Said, I understand you're interested in a judgeship; why don't	19	MS. LITTLE: Counts 2, 3, and 4 charge the defendants	
20	you send me a resume. Turns out he already had resumes from	20	with violating 18 USC Section 666(a)(2), which criminalizes the	
21	other people, that had sent him Judge DeLaughter's. This is	21	offer of a thing of value to an agent of a state or local	
22	March 29th of 2006. Judge DeLaughter wrote him a letter and	22	Government with an intent to influence him in connection with	
23	sent it the next day. It's dated March 30th.	23	any business or transactions of such Government agency provided	
24	Two of the judgeships were gone very quickly, Judge	24	that the Government or agency receives over \$10,000 in federal	
25	well, at least one of them was. Judge Jordan was appointed	25	funding in a one-year period surrounding the charge.	
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1	very soon after that. The trial in this case wasn't until	1	Now, the Government here claims that Judge Henry Lackey is	
2	August. Summary judgment rulings, some of which went against	2	an agent of two entities, Lafayette County and the	
3	the Scruggs firm, were in July. So there it's not it	3	Administrative Office of the Courts. There are three questions	
4	doesn't connect up. It's not like this case. It doesn't add	4	that Your Honor must answer in evaluating our motion. First,	
5	anything. And in fact, it detracts. We'll be spending a lot	5	is Judge Lackey an agent of either Lafayette County or the	
6	of time dealing with something that has really nothing to do	6	Administrative Office?	
7	with this indictment. If they can prove this indictment, let	7	Second, if so, was the purported bribe made in connection	
8	them do it.	8	with any of the business of Lafayette County or the	
9	MR. NORMAN: Your Honor, excuse me. Counsel opposite	9	Administrative Office? And third, if both of those things are	
10	misstated one fact, unintentionally I know.	10	true, is it constitutional, under these facts, to apply the	
11	THE COURT: All right. You may rebut shortly.	11	statute to this conduct? And we respectfully submit that the	
12	MR. NORMAN: All I wanted to say to the Court is that	12	answer to each of these questions is no. This conduct cannot	
13	at one point counsel opposite said there was no money up front	13	be charged under Section 666.	
14	to Ed Peters, and that isn't true. It is true that there was a	14	First, we'll start with the agency question; and we'll	
15	reverse contingency agreement; and because of that agreement, a	15	start with the statute. The Statute 666 defines an agent as a	
16	lot of this money went to Mr. Peters. But \$50,000 of amount	16	person authorized to act on behalf of an organization or	
17	went to Mr. Peters up front in cash in a plain brown envelope	17	Government; and they give the example of servant, employee,	
18	with the statement being made, "There's no 1099 on this."	18	officer, manager, or representative.	
19	MR. KEKER: And I don't think the evidence maybe	19	And then in the Fifth Circuit, the Phillips case I	
20	we can find out. Is there going to be any evidence that	20	think both sides agree that the Phillips case sets forth	
21	Mr. Scruggs said, Pay Mr. Peters as a consultant without a 1099	21	various factors that are considered in applying this statute.	
22	or in cash; or was that something as I understand the	22	Your Honor, Judge Lackey of the Third Circuit Court of	
23	evidence, that's something that Mr. Peters I mean,	23	Mississippi is not an agent of Lafayette County. Lafayette	
24	Mr. Balducci and Mr. Langston cooked up.	24	County is one of eight counties in the third circuit, but he is	
		1		
25	THE COURT: All right. Well, we'll see, maybe. The	25	not an employee or officer of Lafayette County.	

33 1 We start with the Mississippi Constitution. Article I of 1 With respect to -- let me just talk for a minute about the 2 the Mississippi Constitution sets forth the three branches of 2 Administrative Office. I think the Mississippi Constitution 3 Government. Article V discusses the executive branch and 3 answers the question for Lafayette County. It's a separate 4 includes in Section 135 and 138 the county officers under the 4 branch of Government, period. With respect to the 5 executive branch, including sheriff, coroner, assessor, clerks Administrative Office, we can look to the Mississippi Code, 6 of court, members of the board of supervisors, but not judges. 6 Section 9-21-3 -- or excuse me -- dash 1, which is cited in our 7 THE COURT: If he's not an agent of the county or the 7 brief, which says that the Administrative Office of the Court's 8 Administrative Office of the Courts, who is he an agent of? 8 purpose is to administer the nonjudicial business of the 9 MS. LITTLE: He's a member of the judicial branch. 9 courts. That sort of answers it right there. 10 It is a separate branch of Government. 10 Judge Lackey is doing the judicial business and the 11 THE COURT: Is he an agent of any governmental 11 Administrative Office does the nonjudicial business. Judge 12 institution? 12 Lackey is not an agent of the Administrative Office. And 13 MS. LITTLE: I suppose he'd be an agent of -- I mean, 13 again, if you apply the Phillips' test, the Administrative he's an agent of the courts, of the Supreme Court. I mean, it 14 14 Office does not set the judge's duties; the Administrative 15 comes under the judicial branch, Article VI, which has the 15 Office does not supervise the judges, does not pay the judges' 16 judicial branch, as opposed to article V, which is the 16 salaries. Those all come from the state; they do not come from 17 executive branch 17 the Administrative Office of the Courts. 18 THE COURT: I think the statute also says a manager, 18 The second factor that Your Honor must consider is whether 19 doesn't it, an agent or a manager of a governmental unit? 19 this alleged bribe happened in connection with any of the 20 MS. LITTLE: Yes. But Judge Lackey is not a manager 20 business of either Lafayette County or the Administrative 21 of Lafayette County either nor is he manager of the 21 Office. And again, this is really - it's tied to the agency 22 administrative offices of the U.S. -- excuse me -- of the 22 question. It's really, is there an action that's in the scope 23 courts. I say U.S. Courts; I'm thinking Your Honor certainly 23 of the agent's power? 24 wouldn't consider yourself a manager of the AO of the federal 24 And again, Judge Lackey does not conduct the business of 25 judiciary. 25 Lafayette County. He conducts the judicial business, but he 34 36 1 THE COURT: No. Well, I don't know. But anyway -doesn't operate funds or do any of the business of Lafayette 2 sometimes I think they're the manager of us. 2 County. I mean, the business he conducts is settling disputes 3 MS. LITTLE: I think Mr. Meacham thinks that, Your 3 between private litigants. And Lafayette County could even be 4 Honor, but --4 a litigant before Judge Lackey. But he does not conduct 5 THE COURT: Yes. But he's gone now. 5 Lafayette County's business. 6 MS. LITTLE: Okay. 6 THE COURT: Well, could a -- under your theory, could 7 7 THE COURT: But, at any rate, does not a circuit a circuit judge ever be a party to a 666(e) charge? 8 judge manage some of the moneys of the county? 8 MS. LITTLE: Yes, if there's some relationship to 9 MS. LITTLE: Your Honor, the legislature will 9 some moneys involved. For example, the Castro case cited in 10 appropriate moneys that can used for courthouse facilities and 10 our brief talks about kickbacks to a judge in order to get the like. But that doesn't make Judge Lackey a manager of the 11 11 public defender appointment moneys paid. Or, for example, 12 county any more than -- you know, Your Honor has to sign CJA 12 there's the Massey and the Grubb case which involved judges 13 vouchers, for example. Those are moneys that are appropriated 13 spending moneys for the hiring of detectives. 14 by the U.S. Treasury. They're appropriated down. 14 So when there's a bribe to a judge that somehow involves 15 You have to sign the vouchers for those moneys to be paid 15 the judge doing something involving moneys, then there can be a 16 for indigent defense, but that doesn't make you an agent of the 16 666 violation. Here, the claim is that a bribe was paid to 17 U.S. Treasury, nor does it make you an agent of the 17 influence a judge's ruling, has nothing to do with anything Administrative Office. It's the three branches of Government 18 18 with the public funds. It's simply to influence a ruling 19 each have their roles. The legislature appoints the funds, and 19 between private parties. 20 they're used by the Courts as necessary. 20 And interestingly, the only cases where that kind of 21 This is in the Hosford case, and the Supreme Court of 21 conduct has happened -- they're out of circuit. But the Frega 22 Mississippi discusses this, how it's the legislature's 22 case in San Diego -- this is a huge investigation in San Diego 23 obligation to provide the funding that's necessary for the 23 involving 12 years' worth of corruption where plaintiffs' 24 courts to do their business. But that does not create an 24 lawyers were paying superior court judges to influence their 25 agency relationship. 25 rulings in cases. And Judge Rafeedie in San Diego said that

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1	cannot be a 666 violation.	1	was the Southern District of California. As you said, Judge	
2	Similarly, the McCormick case out of Massachusetts cited	2	Rafeedie held that the federal bribery statute did not apply	
3	in our brief has to do with bribes to police officers in order	3	because there was no money.	
4	to not investigate something. Again, the Court said, that	4	But, as you correctly cited later in one of your	
5	can't be a 666 violation. Because it's not there's no	5	footnotes, that was before the Sabri v. U.S. which held that it	
6	involvement of the public funds there. It's simply paying a	6	was not necessary to have a nexus between the federal funds and	
7	public official to influence their decision-making, but not to	7	the act charged.	
8	influence their involvement with public moneys, as was the case	8	MS. LITTLE: That's right, Your Honor. But there	
9	in Castro and Massey.	9	still has to be a connection to some kind of funds. And if you	
10	So unless there's some kind of tie to the money that's	10	look at the Sabri case, it talks about that. It says,	
11	the point of the Phillips case in Louisiana. There has to be	11	Otherwise, you would just criminalize purely local acts; and	
12	some connection between the bribe and the money, some	12	that would upset the federal state balance that our	
13	expenditure of public money; and that's not present here.	13	Constitution holds so dear. There's got to be some kind of	
14	Finally, Your Honor, on the constitutional point, in order	14	connection to some funds.	
15	for this conduct to be punishable and be constitutional, there	15	Sabri talks first of all, Sabri is of course, it's a	
16	has – as I just mention, there has to be some connection to	16	facial challenge. It's not a challenge to the law as applied.	
17	money being influenced. This 666 comes under the Necessary and	17	But what's important is in Sabri it talks about it says,	
18	Proper Clause of the Constitution, the spending power. There's	18	*Congress has the power to keep a watchful eye on expenditures	
19	got to be some nexus to money some how.	19	and to protect spending objects from the menace of local	
20	Now, the Sabri case says you don't have to show a direct	20	administrators on the take."	
21	connection between the crime and specific federal dollars.	21	So while Sabri says you don't have to show a direct link	
22	because money is liquid and you don't have to tie it right to	22	to the actual federal dollars, because, as Sabri points out,	
23	the federal dollars. But there's got to be some connection to	23	dollars are dollars, they are fungible, it's liquid. But you	
24	some expenditure of money somewhere or else it's	24	still have to have some connection to spending, to funding.	
25	unconstitutional as applied.	25	Otherwise, you just have a purely local crime.	
	anonomana ao appinoa.	2.0	officialist, you just have a purely local offfice.	
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1	So for these reasons, this conduct cannot be reached by	1	In the Fischer case, that's discussed. Otherwise, you're	
2	666. And Your Honor asked exactly the right question, Can a	2	going to have a situation where purely local offenses, which	
3	judicial officer ever be charged? Yes, if the judicial officer	3	are punishable by state law, end up coming into federal court	
4	is being bribed in order to do something to spend public	4	where they don't belong.	
5	moneys, like pay an indigent defense counsel, like pay for a	5	Mississippi has a state court a state bribery statute	
6	private detective.	6	that could apply here. Just as in the Frega case, Judge	
7	But when a judge is being bribed to influence rulings	7	Rafeedie noted that the California Penal Code, Section 93,	
8	between private parties the Frega case, the McCormick case	8	which criminalizes bribery of local people. That does not	
9	say, no, that cannot be a 666 violation.	9	that's enough. The state's rights can punish that conduct if	
10	THE COURT: All right. Well, are you familiar with	10	they want to, but that doesn't mean the case belongs in federal	
11	the Fifth Circuit case that holds that if a judicial officer	11	court.	
12	is merely corrupt and can be bribed, that that in itself	12	THE COURT: If this state statute was the one that	
13	threatens the integrity of the federal funds, that that	13	was going to control, who would prosecutor that?	
14	judicial officer has some ability to control?	14	MS. LITTLE: That would be up to the state D.A.	
15			THE COURT. However However, D. & No. 2 and december.	
	MS. LITTLE: Is it the Lipscomb case?	15	THE COURT: I know; I know. But I've read recently	
16	MS. LITTLE: Is it the Lipscomb case? THE COURT: Even though there was no money involved	15 16	that the Attorney General said he wouldn't prosecute this case.	
16 17				
	THE COURT: Even though there was no money involved	16	that the Attorney General said he wouldn't prosecute this case.	
17	THE COURT: Even though there was no money involved in the act that he was bribed for, Fifth Circuit case?	16 17	that the Attorney General said he wouldn't prosecute this case. MS. LITTLE: I think there's district attorneys,	
17 18	THE COURT: Even though there was no money involved in the act that he was bribed for, Fifth Circuit case? MS. LÍTTLE: No.	16 17 18	that the Attorney General said he wouldn't prosecute this case. MS. LITTLE: I think there's district attorneys, there's other folks, that could prosecute it.	
17 18 19	THE COURT: Even though there was no money involved in the act that he was bribed for, Fifth Circuit case? MS. LÍTTLE: No. THE COURT: Well, I don't have it. Let's see	16 17 18 19	that the Attorney General said he wouldn't prosecute this case. MS. LITTLE: I think there's district attorneys, there's other folks, that could prosecute it. THE COURT: All right. No. I mean, just because one	
17 18 19 20	THE COURT: Even though there was no money involved in the act that he was bribed for, Fifth Circuit case? MS. LITTLE: No. THE COURT: Well, I don't have it. Let's see MS. LITTLE: Is it maybe the Lipscomb case or the	16 17 18 19 20	that the Attorney General said he wouldn't prosecute this case. MS. LITTLE: I think there's district attorneys, there's other folks, that could prosecute it. THE COURT: All right. No. I mean, just because one state institution says they would not take on the case doesn't	
17 18 19 20 21	THE COURT: Even though there was no money involved in the act that he was bribed for, Fifth Circuit case? MS. LITTLE: No. THE COURT: Well, I don't have it. Let's see — MS. LITTLE: Is it maybe the Lipscomb case or the I'm not sure which case you're talking about.	16 17 18 19 20 21	that the Attorney General said he wouldn't prosecute this case. MS. LITTLE: I think there's district attorneys, there's other folks, that could prosecute it. THE COURT: All right. No. I mean, just because one state institution says they would not take on the case doesn't mean that that would give this Court jurisdiction.	
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41 1 with that case? 1 Jolly pointed to in the Phillips case were, for instance, 2 MS. LITTLE: Yes. The Lipscomb case is -- frankly, 2 whether or not the principal had control over the agent. 3 I'm not quite sure what to do with it. It's a very long 3 In this case, back to 9-1-36, as I pointed out in the 4 opinion, about a hundred pages. You have -- Judge Wiener, 4 response, judges -- circuit judges have to come up with a plan, 5 writes a very lengthy opinion on discussing the Phillips test 5 a personnel plan; and they have to then submit that plan as to 6 6 and whatnot. Judge Duhé concurs in the result but not in that how they're going to be utilizing the funds of the 7 analysis, and then Judge Smith dissents. So I'm not even sure 7 Administrative Office. 8 what precedential value the Lipscomb case has. 8 And pursuant to the statute, I cited the statute and 9 It's very scholarly and interesting to read, but I'm not 9 quoted it. They then determine whether they'll accept that plan 10 10 sure that it has -- because there's a concurring opinion that or not. They're certainly exercising authority over them when 11 doesn't join in that particular analysis, I'm not sure how much 11 they decide whether or not they're going to allow him to 12 value it has to us. Thank you. 12 utilize a particular plan. 13 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Mr. Sanders? 13 Another example, as I pointed out, is whether he can rent MR. SANDERS: Your Honor, I don't think the Lipscomb 14 14 a particular property or not. If Judge Lackey wanted to rent 15 case has any value to the defense position in this case either. 15 his own building, for instance, then he's - he must then 16 I want to respond - I can respond to defense counsel's 16 provide an appraisal for the value of that property. And then 17 arguments in the same order she made them. 17 it's up to the Administrative Office of Courts whether or not 18 First of all, I want to respond to her agency argument. 18 they're going to be willing -- they're willing to pay money for 19 The Government's position is that Judge Lackey was an agent of 19 him to rent that particular property. It's just another the Administrative Office of Courts and of Lafayette County. 20 20 example of them having control over him. 21 As defense counsel pointed out, the first place to look is the 21 Whether he has control over -- another question that comes 22 statute itself, subsection D(1) of 666 points out that the 22 out of the Phillips case, whether Judge Lackey has control over 23 definition of an agent, for purposes of this statute, is 23 employees of the Administrative Office of Courts comes, again, 24 whether he's a representative authorized to act on behalf of 24 right out of 9-1-36. The statute provides specifically that 25 the agency at issue 25 the employees working for him, the specific ones who are 42 1 As to - and just as an example, as to the Administrative considered employees of the Administrative Office, are there at 2 Office of Courts, Mississippi's statute, 9-1-36 -- I think I've 2 the will and pleasure of the circuit judges. So he certainly 3 cited in my brief -- points out that certain funds come to the 3 has control over his court administrator, for instance, who is 4 Administrative Office of Courts and those funds are then sent 4 seen as an employee of the Administrative Office 5 5 to the various circuit judges in the state. The Phillips case, as I know the Court is aware, was 6 I think he receives \$40,000 per year for staffing. He 6 actually a case with a tax assessor out of the state of 7 7 receives \$4,000 a year for supplies. He receives \$4,000 for Louisiana and whether or not he was an agent of the Louisiana 8 rent, as an example, if he wants to rent office space. And in 8 Parish. It's a case that is pretty fact specific as well. As 9 fact, Judge Lackey does use that money as well. He certainly 9 this Court is aware, I'm sure -- and as every first year law 10 is authorized to act on behalf of the Administrative Office 10 student is aware - when you learn in law school a rule of law with that money. In fact, when he gets that money, he then 11 11 and your textbook tells you that 49 states have followed that 12 goes out and hires his staff. 12 particular rule of law, you realize pretty quickly that that 13 It's up to Judge Lackey who he's going to hire as a law 13 one state is almost always going to be Louisiana. 14 clerk, for instance, or a court administrator, Ms. Monette, for 14 So the tax administrator's position as is opposed to 15 instance, Judge Lackey hires. He even is authorized to decide 15 the -- as it relates to the parish doesn't have a great deal of 16 where he wants to rent property. He chooses the supplies. 16 value when we're looking at a circuit judge in the state of 17 When they send him \$4,000 for supplies, they don't actually 17 18 send him a \$4,000 check. He actually goes out and purchases 18 But one of the other points they look to is whether or not

> 19 the parish paid the tax assessor's salary in Louisiana. They 20 pointed out that the parish had nothing to do with his salary.

> 21 In this case, we don't dispute that the state pays Judge

22 Lackey's salary; but it's certainly administered and goes

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through the Administrative Office of Courts.

24 As to Lafayette County, whether or not Judge Lackey is an

25 agent of Lafayette County, again, we're looking to see whether

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everything he needs and then sends an invoice to the court. So

certainly when he is out looking, he is authorized to act on

Under the Phillips case -- and I'm not certain how much

precedential value Phillips has left. Judge Jolly relied very

Supreme Court in Sabri. But a few of the factors that Judge

heavily on principles that were abrogated by, I think, the

behalf of the Administrative Office.

45 47 1 he's authorized to act on behalf of the county. It almost goes 1 are always aware that if they are unable to resolve conflicts 2 without saying that a circuit judge acts routinely on behalf of 2 that the circuit courts are going to be there to help them 3 Lafayette County. First and foremost, the orders he signs are 3 resolve these conflicts. If they want to then go into the 4 headed by "in the United States -- or "In the Circuit Court of 4 court, they're going to pay - as I pointed out in my 5 Lafayette County." I'm making the same mistake defense counsel 5 response -- a fee. They're going to pay \$107. For instance, 6 6 Johnny Jones, in this case, paid \$107 to have the circuit court 7 But as examples of him acting on behalf of Lafayette 7 provide a service, to have Judge Lackey hear the case, to have 8 County, when Judge Lackey is hearing cases at the courthouse 8 a court administrator work the case. 9 here on the square, he may be assessing fines to certain 9 THE COURT: One thing I didn't understand about your 10 parties, perhaps to an attorney who shows up late. All of 10 brief, you said that these fees to bring a case into court, to 11 those fines go straight to the general fund of Lafayette 11 file a case, you listed a hundred dollars or something for him 12 County, certainly acting on behalf of the county. to file a civil case. And then you listed something like \$370 12 13 He is the one who chooses who will be the county's victim 13 to file a criminal case. Who pays that in a criminal case? 14 assistance coordinator, for instance. He selects the public 14 MR. SANDERS: Yes, sir, I believe the district 15 15 defender. As I pointed out in my response brief, just recently attorney's office pays that. 16 in Lafayette County I think there were a number of supervisors 16 THE COURT: Really? 17 who wanted to change the public defender. I think it was 17 MR. SANDERS: I'm not certain of that. I just know 18 Mr. Ken Coghlan, who was involved in this case at one point. 18 that to bring a criminal case in circuit court --19 And Judge Lackey wouldn't allow it. He was certainly acting on 19 THE COURT: You mean the district attorney's office 20 behalf of the county. 20 has to pay \$370 every time they file an indictment? 21 If the public defenders, for instance, have a conflict of 21 MR. SANDERS: I'm not certain one way or the other. 22 interest -- as I pointed out in my response -- it's Judge 22 I think there's a \$300 fee for every criminal case that is 23 Lackey who then, for the county, selects a private individual. 23 brought, but I don't know who pays that. 24 That private individual who represents an indigent defendant 24 THE COURT: It's probably never collected. It'd 25 would also submit to Judge Lackey his bill at the end of the 25 probably be by the defendant. 46 48 1 day; and it's Judge Lackey who determines whether or not the 1 MR. SANDERS: It may well be. 2 county is going to pay that much. I could go on. 2 THE COURT: Taxed as court costs to the defendant. 3 I mean, Judge Lackey is going to order the county to pay 3 But I don't think it's paid up front; when you file an 4 any expenses, for instance, that that particular defense 4 indictment, somebody has to pay \$370. 5 5 counsel wants. If he wanted a psychiatric evaluation or if he MR. SANDERS: May not be. I may have gotten that 6 wanted a witness from across country. I know that different 6 wrong. I do know though, however, in a civil case. As we're 7 attorneys oftentimes ask for that stuff, and the supervisors 7 talking about before us now, that the plaintiff does pay a \$107 8 wring their hands because the judge is ordering the county to 8 fee when he files his complaint. 9 pay those kinds of things. 9 Obviously, when he files that complaint, he is expecting a 10 Whether Judge Lackey has control over county employees, I 10 service to be provided from Judge Lackey, from all the staff, 11 don't think there's anybody over in the courthouse who would 11 from the county employees, everyone working that case. 12 say that Judge Lackey doesn't have control over them, from the 12 Portions of that \$107 fee go to pay employees of the circuit clerk all the way down to law clerks, court reporters, 13 13 Administrative Office of Courts and go to pay salaries of the 14 anyone else who the Administrative Office and the county both 14 county employees. 15 pay their salaries. 15 Obviously, as well, the bribe paid to Judge Lackey was 16 Finally -- well, not finally. Secondly, as to whether or 16 certainly in connection with Judge Lackey's position as a 17 not there is a connection with the bribe paid in this case and 17 circuit judge. So I think clearly the bribe paid in that was 18 a business transaction or series of transactions of the 18 absolutely in connection with a business transaction of both 19 Administrative Office or Lafayette County, as I pointed out in 19 the Administrative Office and Lafayette County. 20 my response, certainly cases being heard in circuit courts in 20 Finally, their argument that this statute is 21 the state of Mississippi today are very real parts of the 21 unconstitutional as applied to them in this case. The first 22 business -- anyone who is in business, anyone who's practicing argument they make is that public money must be implicated. 22 23 law in the state now, circuit courts are a very real part of 23 That's not my interpretation of the Sabri decision. In fact, 24 their business. 24 the Sabri decision made it clear that there didn't have to be 25 And any sort of contract dispute -- parties to contracts 25 any connection for jurisdiction purposes between the forbidden

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1	conduct and the federal funds,	1	MS. LITTLE: Your Honor, very briefly?	
2	THE COURT: What were the facts in the Sabri	2	THE COURT: Yes.	
3	decision?	3	MS. LITTLE: I'd like to respond to a couple of	
4	MR. SANDERS: In the Sabri decision, I do believe	4	points. Mr. Sanders referred to the business of office space	
5	that Sabri was a developer in Minnesota; and he was bribing	5	being provided – or money for office being provided by the	
6	someone, I believe on a city council, something like that; so	6	Administrative Office. In fact, my understanding is that — at	
7	that he would then be able to avoid certain ordinances, certain	7	least for the office supplies and rent, the money does not come	
8	zoning regulations, that kind of thing, I believe that was it.	8	from the Administrative Office. It comes from the treasury	
9	The Court, though, eventually ruled that	9	from the state treasury and is certified by the Supreme Court.	
10	THE COURT: What about the Lipscomb case, the Fifth	10	But in any case, if you look at the Phillips case,	
11	Circuit case that Ms. Little said she didn't have any	11	footnote 13 talks about the fact that the parish there provides	
12	much didn't like?	12	office space and the like; but that doesn't make Mr. Phillips,	
13	MR. SANDERS: Yes, sir.	13		
14	THE COURT: What are the facts of that?	14	as the tax collector, an agent of the parish. And similarly,	
15	MR. SANDERS: Your Honor, I'm not familiar with the		the Hosford case in the Mississippi Supreme Court talks about	
16	facts of the Lipscomb case, and I'm not because when I was	15	the fact that the legislature as part of, again, separation	
17	doing the research and reading everything up to this case, I	16	of powers, the legislature is required to appropriate funds in	
18	felt like Lipscomb the decision that Lipscomb made, as well	17	order for the judiciary to do its job, but that does not create	
19	as Moeller, I believe, those decisions were so completely	18	an agency relationship.	
20	abrogated by the Sabri case because they were they spent a	19	Briefly, on the Lipscomb case, Lipscomb involved a Dallas	
21	great deal of time and effort discussing whether or not there		city counsel person, as I recall. But it did not involve a	
22	had to be a connection to the federal funds. And when Sabri	21 22	judge. And what I'm thinking about is essentially the	
23	came in, they ruled there didn't have to be any connection		Government hasn't cited a single case where a circuit court or	
24	whatsoever.	23 24	a state court judge is prosecuted under Section 666 for being	
25	I think that Lipscomb was made post Salinas. And Salinas		bribed for a ruling. That's what this case is about, and I'm	
2.0	Turink that Elpscomb was made post Salmas. And Salmas	25	not aware of any case where 666 has been applied in that	
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1	had intimated that that was the case but hadn't come right out.	1	situation, the situation that we have before us.	
- 2	•			
2 3	They had put some language in the Salinas case that looked like	2	Finally, I just wanted to point out that, yes, there's got	
3	They had put some language in the Salinas case that looked like there may still need to be some connection in some instance,	2	Finally, I just wanted to point out that, yes, there's got to be some kind of after Sabri, there still has to be some	
3 4	They had put some language in the Salinas case that looked like there may still need to be some connection in some instance, and that's kind of what the Lipscomb case discussed. And then	3 4	Finally, I just wanted to point out that, yes, there's got to be some kind of after Sabri, there still has to be some kind of connection to money. I don't mean to argue that it's	
3 4 5	They had put some language in the Salinas case that looked like there may still need to be some connection in some instance, and that's kind of what the Lipscomb case discussed. And then the Sabri decision came in next and made it clear that there	2 3 4 5	Finally, I just wanted to point out that, yes, there's got to be some kind of after Sabri, there still has to be some kind of connection to money. I don't mean to argue that it's only purely state and local money. There's got to be a pool of	
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53 1 Again, "Congress has the power to keep a watchful eve on 1 corrupt act of the Government official. In that case, it was a 2 expenditures and protect spending objects from the menace of 2 sheriff who allowed, for a fee, certain contact visits by the 3 local administrators on the take." Here, Judge Lackey was 3 girlfriends or wives of the federal prisoners who were kept in 4 allegedly bribed to issue a ruling between two private parties. 4 the county jail temporarily. And the Fifth Circuit held in 5 There's no expenditure of public moneys of any kind involved. 5 that case that that was sufficient to violate -- to invoke 6 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 6 jurisdiction on -- under 666(e) 7 All right. We will be in recess now for 15 minutes. 7 And they said specifically, Section 666(a)(1)(B) does not 8 (AFTER A SHORT BREAK, THE PROCEEDING CONTINUED) 8 require the Government to prove the bribe in question, had a 9 (CALL TO ORDER OF THE COURT) 9 demonstrative -- demonstrated effect on federal funds. The 10 THE COURT: All right. The Court is -- tell her to 10 enactment's plain language is expansive and unqualified, both come back in here, please. The Court is -- has considered the 11 11 as to the bribes forbidden and the entities covered, 12 arguments and the briefs filed by the attorneys on their motion 12 demonstrating by its reference to quote any business or 13 to dismiss Counts 2, 3, and 4, and finds that -- that the -- a 13 transaction. And that is not confined to transactions circuit judge does have duties that makes him or her an agent 14 14 affecting federal funds. 15 or a manager of a county in which the circuit court sits and of 15 So based on the liberal -- more liberal interpretation of 16 the Administrative Office of the Court in that the judge has 16 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals than the Ninth Circuit, the 17 authority to hire certain employees, pay them from county 17 Court is of the opinion that the motion to dismiss Counts 2, 3, 18 funds, or from AO funds. 18 and 4 should be denied. And it will be so ordered. Of course, 19 He has the authority to buy supplies. He has the 19 the Court reserves the right to supplement this order, 20 authority to appoint public defenders, to levy fines whose 20 delivered orally from the bench, at a later time. 21 moneys go into the county treasury. And from which treasury. 21 All right. It's 11:25. We will be in recess now until 22 he can expend certain funds for other purposes. He also has 22 one o'clock and, at that time, take up -- start on the 23 the -- or she -- has the authority to appoint deputy court 23 remaining motions, which will be the two motions for severance 24 24 clerks during term times of Court and set per diem rates for and the motion for a change of venue. I am not prejudging by 25 25 those clerks and how many days they would be paid. change of venue that - well, change of venue is still on the 56 1 And even though the order -- this order of the -- of Judge table, it's still in play, regardless of the Court's ruling on 2 Lackey in this case, which he was allegedly given money to 2 the suppression of the wiretaps. 3 issue, did not affect any federal funds or any funds at all, 3 Because the suppression of wiretaps alone would not 4 the Court has reviewed two cases that it believes is 4 dismiss this case. So change of venue is still relevant. And 5 controlling in this case. 5 we'll take those two motions up -- those three motions up at 6 The Fifth Circuit obviously gives a much more liberal 6 one o'clock, starting with the two motions to sever; and then 7 interpretation to Title 18, Section 666, than does the Ninth 7 the remaining motion will be the change of venue. We'll be in 8 Circuit in the cases that were cited by the attorney for the 8 recess until one o'clock. 9 defendant. The Ninth Circuit obviously has held that there 9 (AFTER A LUNCH BREAK, THE PROCEEDING CONTINUED) 10 must be some affecting of federal -- of money by the issuing of 10 (CALL TO ORDER OF THE COURT) 11 the order, if 666 is to apply. The Fifth Circuit has held the 11 THE COURT: We have two motions to sever. Which 12 opposite. 12 motion do the defendants want to take up first, Mr. Backstrom 13 The Lipscomb case in the Fifth Circuit was -- had a 13 or Mr. Scruggs? factual basis of a city councilman who was -- who had bribed 14 14 MR. GRAVES: Mr. Scruggs' motion, Your Honor. 15 a -- or a city councilman who had been bribed by a taxi cab 15 THE COURT: Very well. 16 company to issue certain votes and to - in favor of the taxi 16 MR. GRAVES: Good afternoon, Your Honor. My name's 17 cab company, did not involve expenditure of funds and that was 17 Todd Graves, along with -- Nathan Garrett's here at counsel 18 held to incur jurisdiction. table with me. We represent Zachary Scruggs. The motion 18 19 That case said specifically that a corrupt or state 19 before us is the motion to sever Mr. Zachary Scruggs from this 20 official who has real responsibility for, or often participates 20 trial, and I want to basically go right to Rule 14. We've 21 in, the allocation of federal funds is a threat to the 21 briefed this pretty extensively, but the gravamen of Rule 14 is 22 integrity of those funds even if they are not actually directly 22 prejudice; and that's what I want to focus on. 23 affected by his corruption. 23 And in the Zafiro case in 1992 the U.S. Supreme Court 24 Also in the Fifth Circuit, the Salinas case was a case 24 said, quote, there is a serious risk that a joint trial would 25 which did not involve the expenditure of any funds by the compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants or

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1 prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or 2 innocence." They went on to say the defendants are tried 3 together in a complex case, and they have markedly different degrees of culpability. This risk is heightened 4 5 And I think there's essentially three reasons why there's 6 a high risk of prejudice in this case. The first reason is 7 there's a huge distance in terms of the proof that the Government's prepared to offer about Zachary Scruggs and about 8 9 the other defendants in this case. That's not to suggest that I think the other proof will be sufficient to a jury; but 10 there's -- under any analysis, there's a huge spread. 11 12 There are only, really, three thin threads that we wrote about in our motion coming into this that connect Mr. Zach 13 14 Scruggs to this case; and those are only incriminating if you 15 already believe that he knew that there was a major afoot, if 16 there was a major afoot to bribe the judge and that he knew 17 about it. Otherwise, those three thin threads in and of 18 themselves are not incriminating. 19 Something that Your Honor said earlier in response to -- I 20 think it was a motion for outrageous conduct, was that there 21 was ample evidence that there was more than passive conduct on 22 behalf of all the defendants. And respectfully, I would 23 disagree with that. I don't know that there is any evidence of 24 more than passive conduct on behalf of Zachary Scruggs, and I 25 think in that motion alone the outrageous conduct motion -- his

2 decided that he's a member of this conspiracy, it doesn't 3 connect him to this case. 4 The third thread is the one we heard about yesterday that 5 said that Mr. Zach Scruggs may have been in the room when Tim 6 Balducci, who was only coming up into that office that day 7 because he was a Government agent and going up to incriminate 8 others based on the conduct he'd been caught with - Zach 9 Scruggs allegedly was in a room for a small portion of the 10 conversation. 11 There's no allegation -- you can listen to the tape. He 12 doesn't even say anything. This Government agent makes 13 statements that at best would be confusing to a person and, at 14 worst, would be gibberish. And Mr. Zach Scruggs says nothing. 15 And somehow, that is evidence that he has joined a conspiracy. 16 And one of the things that I found interesting after we were given the grand jury transcripts yesterday, even the 17 agent's description of what took place in that room when 18 19 Mr. Balducci went in the office and spoke to Sid Backstrom and 20 Zach Scruggs was in the room for a period of time - the 21 Government's description of that to the grand jury is not 22 23 I'm not suggesting in any way that he went in and lied 24 about it. What I'm suggesting is it's such a fine point that this has come down to about what was said on a particular day

related to this case, but especially if you haven't already

1 position is different than the other defendants. 2 To say that his actions in this case, from what we've been 3 provided, is passive would overstate his involvement in this 4 case. The three threads we talked about, one of them was the 5 initial meeting. He was present at the initial meeting in 6 March when there was a discussion about attempting to influence 7 the judge in some manner, about the arbitration order. 8 Well, the Government has conceded yesterday -- or my 9 understanding of what I heard was there is no allegation that 10 that meeting, in and of itself, was -- would support the 11 indictment. And, so, I think one of three threads that I came 12 to this hearing with doesn't even exist; so now we're down to 13 two threads that we have to deal with. 14 The second thread is that Zachary Scruggs was in a 15 conference room when an order was delivered. And the description of what took place when this order was delivered, I 16 17 think -- and again, I'm not perhaps -- perhaps I'm mistaken, but I think it's the only place he's even mentioned in any of 18 19 the tapes in this case. 20 He was sitting in a conference room behind the reception 21 station. The Scruggs Law Firm, the way it's laid out, there's 22 a little conference room with some books in there, right behind 23 that. He's sitting there working. Mr. Balducci comes up to 24 deliver an order and walks in and hands it to him. And I don't

see how that even connects him to this case. It was an order

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the phrasing of it and the description to the grand jury and the tape, I think, are significantly different. Again --THE COURT: Would you be more specific on how it was inaccurate? MR. GRAVES: Yes, I would, Your Honor. And I don't have page numbers on these transcripts, so it's hard for me to describe it. This is the grand jury transcript of 11-06 of 10 William Delaney. And toward the back of what I have -- again, I don't have a page number. His description, quote, 12 Mr. Balducci to go back to Judge Lackey. This is a paraphrase 13 of Mr. Delaney of Mr. Balducci's -- what he said in that room 14 on that day. Mr. Balducci to go back to Judge Lackey on the first. 15 Quote, plus the fact that you still owe me \$10,000 from your 16 original agreement." That's not in the tape. That's not what 17 18 was said. And that would be a pretty incriminating statement 19 if that was said 20 Second one -- I only have two, Your Honor -- the next page. Quote -- paraphrased quote of Mr. Delaney paraphrasing 21 the statement of Mr. Balducci, what Mr. Balducci would say, 22 23 quote, you guys are paying for it, so you might as well get it 24 the way you like it. And they both agreed that it is fine as

and that, therefore, Zach Scruggs belongs in this case; that

even the change of one word or two is pretty important. And

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it is.

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1 After Mr. Balducci talked with Zach Scruggs and Sid 2 Backstrom about this order and that they had paid for it and 3 get it like they wanted it, he did later have -- and it goes on 4 and that -- again, I'm not alleging that the agent purposely 5 misled the grand jury. What I'm alleging is it's a jumbling of 6 what actually happened. 7

And because it's such a fine pint and one thin thread that his involvement in this case depends on, those changing of the wording that "you paid for it; you still owe me 10,000," that's pretty significant as to his position in this case

Mr. Scruggs is not -- Mr. Zach Scruggs -- and it sounds silly to say that, but that's the way we're going to have to conduct this trial. But Mr. Zach Scruggs is not even mentioned in the September 25th or the October 16th affidavit. When Tim Balducci gives his preamble before he goes up to attempt to incriminate members of this firm, he says, "I'm going up to talk to Sid Backstrom and possibly to Dick Scruggs."

Mr. Zach Scruggs wasn't even mentioned in the preamble. I think that the evidence will show, based on the evidence, that I know anything about - we can't even show -- the Government can't even show that he was a willing participant in an unlawful conspiracy. Yet I think it is also very possible that he might be convicted solely on the basis of the weight of the evidence against others, including his father. And I think

1 the Government said. "In the Wilson case, the Scruggs Law Firm

2 was the defendant."

3 Well the Scruggs Law Firm wasn't the defendant in the

4 Wilson case. That was a different situation before the Scruggs

5 Law Firm existed. And if that would have gone horribly wrong

6 for Mr. Dick Scruggs' position in that case, it wouldn't have

7 cost Zach Scruggs a dime. So that is the kind of confusion

8 that I fear that we're going to have to deal with throughout

9 this case.

10 And even Mr. Keker, who, through no intent but an intent 11 to try to describe who he's talking about and the difference in 12 these -- he said, when he was making one of his motions --13 arguments earlier referred to Zach Scruggs as Dick Scruggs'

14 son. And those are the sort of descriptive elements that I

15 think would lead to prejudice.

16 Yesterday, throughout the whole hearing -- and we tried to 17 keep track, and perhaps with a transcript -- which I haven't 18 been through -- I might be off by one. But I think only once 19 or twice throughout the whole hearing when Mr. Scruggs was 20 referred to was it made clear whether they were talking about 21 Mr. Dick Scruggs or Mr. Zach Scruggs. And again, that element 22 of confusion would lead to prejudice.

23 Based on this huge canyon of evidence, as I see it - and 24 based on that, I don't see how a curative instruction could

25 bridge that canyon by telling the jury to put this out of their

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Let me step aside here very quickly. If the Court were inclined to leave Mr. Zach Scruggs in this case. I think that

3 we are entitled to a James hearing based on the things I just

that goes to the heart of prejudice.

4 said. The standard of evidence is a preponderance that the

5 declarant and the defendant were members of the conspiracy, the 6

same conspiracy.

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The statement was made during the course of the conspiracy and was made in the furtherance of the conspiracy. And I think that this is the unusual case where it is unclear whether they could meet the standard by a preponderance, let alone by a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Zach Scruggs was even a member of an unlawful conspiracy. So that's the first thing.

The second thing is just the fact that his name is Scruggs. Beyond the total distance of evidence between he and the other defendants, his name is Scruggs. And Dick Scruggs' name is obviously Scruggs. And as they said in the Auerbach case, which admittedly wasn't a case about severance -- it was a case about ineffective assistance at counsel because they didn't get severance or didn't ask for severance.

Quote, the father/son relationship makes a motion for severance far more compelling than in the usual case of unrelated codefendants. That was from Auerbach, from the Eighth Circuit in 1984. Something that came up earlier here this morning that I think makes it even more compelling is, as we were talking about the 404(b) evidence, one of counsel for mind and sort this out when we, as counsel, counsel for the

2 defense, the Court, the witnesses, can't seem to sort it out at

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4 The last thing I want to point out, not including the

5 distance in degree of evidence between the parties, the fact

6 that the Scruggs name is going to be very confusing. The

7 Scruggs Law Firm is called the Scruggs Law Firm. There's four

partners, there is not just three partners in the firm; there

9 are four partners in the firm.

> Even beyond all that confusion, now we go into the 404(b) evidence; and as I said a minute ago, that deals only with Dick

12 Scruggs for the purposes of this motion. And by assurances

13 that counsel has been given previously, that case, the 404(b)

14 case, there was no indication that Mr. Zach Scruggs was going

15 to be a subject or a target or had anything to do with that

16 case. That was my understanding. I believe that's going to be

17 the Government's position for the purpose of this motion.

This morning, that got clouded up a little bit; but I

19 don't think that's the Government's position this afternoon.

20 For purposes of this motion, he has nothing to do with that

21 case. The Scruggs Law Firm wasn't involved; and I think that,

22 again, it's not just distance, because that -- courts have said

23 that that's not always enough to grant a severance, distance,

father/son name and relationship. You throw in the 404(b) 24

25 evidence.

65 67 1 I think that, in sum, what you start with is this huge 1 Your Honor, with respect to severance and joinder -- and I know 2 spread in the evidence. You pile on the 404(b) evidence 2 that the Court is thoroughly familiar with those issues --3 related to a wholly separate matter, having nothing to do with 3 there is no claim under Rule 8 of a misjoinder. As counsel 4 Zach Scruggs; and you wrap all that evidence and the confusion 4 opposite said, they seek relief only under Rule 14, which is 5 of the name, as it's recited here in the Court in the 5 the discretionary authority of the Court to grant a severance father/son relationship; and what you have is a recipe for a 6 6 in certain circumstances. 7 joint trial that will compromise the fundamental right and 7 And those certain circumstances are that there can -- has 8 prejudice the fundamental right of Zach Scruggs to be judged R to be a showing of compelling prejudice against which the Court 9 fairly and impartially based on his conduct and his conduct 9 is unable to afford protection. Severance has been held by the 10 alone, his knowledge and his knowledge alone, and his intent 10 cases that we have cited in our brief to be a drastic relief, and his intent alone. And I think that calls for severance. 11 and movants have a heavy burden to demonstrate that without 11 THE COURT: I heard something like you did this 12 12 such relief a fair trial cannot be obtained. 13 morning -- I believe from Mr. Norman -- that perhaps Zach 13 Just because there is a quantitative difference between 14 Scruggs would also be a party to the 404(b). Did you hear 14 evidence in a multi-defendant case is not sufficient to warrant 15 that? 15 severance. If that were the case, you could never have a 16 MR. GRAVES: What was really interesting about that, 16 multi-defendant -- and certainly a multi-defendant conspiracy 17 Your Honor, was it wasn't -- we've been led to believe that he 17 case because just about in every one of those types of cases wasn't part of the 404(b). In fact, his previous counsel, as 18 18 the quantitative difference between the defendants is present. 19 part of the waiver of the conflict that we heard about, said 19 However, in conspiracy cases, the evidence -- once a conspiracy 20 that the Government had assured him he wasn't a subject or a 20 is established, the evidence is admissible against all the 21 target. 21 co-conspirators 22 22 And then this morning, the very interesting nuance that I Now, the Fifth Circuit has made it plain in joint trials, 23 heard wasn't, Zach Scruggs will be part of it; but there is 23 especially in conspiracy cases, that severance is frowned upon. 24 404(b) evidence against Dick Scruggs, and Sid Backstrom will 24 And it's not favored at all. All evidence is admissible 25 not be part of that evidence, not saying Zach will or won't be 25 against all co-conspirators. Now, there's a good reason for 66 68 1 part of it. And that is exactly the kind of confusion we are that, because you essentially have to try the same case twice 2 talking about, those sort of nuances. 2 or three times because there is no significant advantage if all 3 THE COURT: In the notice, the 404(b) notice you got, 3 evidence is admissible against all defendants. 4 did they mention Zach Scruggs as being a party to that 4 Now, with respect to the allegations that were made by 5 evidence? 5 counsel opposite, I think that he's certainly -- not 6 MR. GRAVES: The notice is not that detailed. It's 6 intentionally, but understated the evidence with respect to 7 basically a letter saying to look at the previous pleadings and 7 Zach Scruggs. In November, the first transcript, which was 8 8 attached to the response -- I believe the response involving 9 THE COURT: Okay. 9 outrageous Government conduct -- there is considerable 10 MR. GRAVES: - filings. But they did not mention --10 discussion between Balducci, Mr. Backstrom, and Zach Scruggs. 11 11 one, they did not mention Zach Scruggs. Two, they And I won't detail all of it; but Mr. Balducci says, 12 specifically, unless counsel was mistaken -- in the conflict 12 "Zach, let me bring you up to speed. All right. This is on waiver letter that this defendant was given, they specifically 13 13 the Judge Lackey deal. Okay? You know I came by here last 14 said he wasn't the subject or a target of that investigation. 14 week, and I gave you that order." And it goes on to 15 And I can only go based on what previous counsel was told. 15 describe - and the three of them have a discussion about the 16 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you. 16 order that was provided to Judge Lackey -- or Judge Lackey was 17 MR. GRAVES: Thank you, Your Honor. 17 considering entering as a result of having been paid the 18 THE COURT: Does the Government wish to respond? 18 \$40,000. 19 MR. DAWSON: Yes, sir. I didn't know whether the 19 Now, this is not just a normal conversation between 20 Court wanted to -- since we responded to the severance in a 20 attorneys concerning a case about an order a judge has under 21 combined fashion, if you wanted to hear it individually or all 21 consideration. Mr. Balducci is not an attorney of record in 22 22 the Jones v. Scruggs case. He is not a party to it. He has no 23 THE COURT: Well, I'd rather here it individually 23 interest in it. In fact, the Scruggs Law Firm has a very 24 since the reasons are different 24 reputable firm representing them at that time, the Daniel Coker 25 MR. DAWSON: All right, sir. Generally speaking, 25 Horton law firm.

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1	It is clear to anyone in that conversation that something	1	MR. DAWSON: That is correct.	
2	criminal is in afoot. Simply because, later on in the	2	THE COURT: Which implies that that wasn't a crime.	
3	conversation with Backstrom and Zach Scruggs in the room, the	3	MR. DAWSON: Yes, sir.	
4	statement is made, We need to get this right like we want it	4	THE COURT: I wondered why Langston would plead	
5	because we're paying for it. There is not one single	5	guilty if it's not a crime.	
6	objection. There's not one single, What do you mean, Tim	6	MR. DAWSON: That's correct. The point is, in order	
7	Balducci? What have you done? What are you talking about? So	7	to be guilty of a conspiracy to corruptly influence, that can	
8	it is clear that there's much more evidence just out of that	8	be done between people who attempt to do that without going all	
9	conversation than the Court was led to believe.	9	the way down the line and proving that the judge was actually	
10	Now, the other objection, I think, to a joint trial asking	10	influenced corruptly. And that's what Joey Langston pled	
11	the Court for exercise of its discretion relates to the 404(b)	11	guilty to and is prepared to testify about, direct contact with	
12	evidence. Now, it is true that the 404(b) evidence is mainly	12	Dickie Scruggs and others with respect to what they planned to	
13	against Dick Scruggs, one of the co-conspirators. However,	13	do to adversely and corruptly influence the decision by Judge	
14	between the time that this response was prepared and this	14	DeLaughter.	
15	hearing began, we became aware of some evidence that might	15	Once that conspiracy is formed and an overt act is done in	
16	indicate that Zach Scruggs had some knowledge of the back door	16	furtherance of that conspiracy, it matters not whether or not	
17	attempt to influence Judge DeLaughter.	17	Judge DeLaughter was ever actually influenced. And I think	
18	We've told counsel about that evidence, as Mr. Norman	18	that's what the import of what Mr. Norman said was this	
19	indicated today. But I also told counsel that for the	19	morning.	
20	purpose of this motion for severance, that we would assume for	20	THE COURT: Do you not have to go further and show	
21	the sake of argument that both Zach Scruggs and Sid Backstrom	21	that that they carried out some overt act in attempting to	
22	were not implicated in the 404(b) evidence. And while I'm	22	carry forward with that plan, to make that plan come into	
23	mentioning that 404(b) evidence, I think it is clear the	23	fruition?	
24	Court should understand it is clear from the Government that	24	MR. DAWSON: We will show that. We will absolutely	
25	this will be not the full-fledged trial of the Wilson case.	25	show that, with clear evidence. However, if hypothetically	
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1	All the 404(b) evidence its purpose is to show the	1	speaking, if what if all we had was just a discussion	
2	intent of the persons to whom the 404(b) evidence is admitted	'		
3		2	•	
	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	2	between Dickie Scruggs and Joey Langston about, Let's go	
4	against. And that would be to show that they attempted to	3	between Dickie Scruggs and Joey Langston about, Let's go influence the judge; and here's how we'll do it, we'll do X, Y,	
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73 think Zafiro, the Supreme Court case, even alluded to this. 1 THE COURT: All right. 1 2 The mere fact that you might make an argument that you have a 2 MR. DAWSON: Now, if the Court has any additional 3 better chance of being acquitted with a separate trial is not 3 questions with respect to the severance concerning Zach 4 sufficient to warrant a severance. And in this case, we do not 4 Scruggs -- I think at one point he did make that -- or one 5 believe that a severance is appropriate. 5 issue that he raised that I have not addressed -- and that is 6 And moreover, if the Court were to deny severance, that 6 the pretrial publicity as a basis for a severance. 7 doesn't mean the Court can't revisit that issue as the case 7 I'm not sure I quite understand that because whether you 8 develops. We don't think that that would change the Court's 8 try them separately or together, his name is still going to be 9 ruling. But if something would happen, unforeseen, that would 9 Zach Scruggs; and he's still going to have -- work for the 10 cause a drastic prejudicial effect that the Court felt like 10 Scruggs Law Firm. I don't know how you change that. So I that it could not protect the defendant, then you could always 11 11 don't think that -- that that ground as urged -- it seems to me 12 grant a severance at that time. 12 13

It's not something we recommend. I just point out that -under Rule 14, that that is a continuing situation with respect to the granting or denying of severance.

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THE COURT: All right. Now, Mr. Dawson, under your duty to give notice to the defendants under 404(b), what do you plan on doing? What's the Government's position as to how much detail you must go into in telling them what the synopsis of the evidence is you plan on presenting? I've heard Mr. Norman say three witnesses you anticipate calling. But I'm still not clear on -

23 MR. DAWSON: What the adequate notice is? 24 THE COURT: Well, and I'm not clear on -- yes. And 25 if you don't think you should tell -- should state at this time

to be a nonsegregate in an argument. And if the Court has any 13 other questions? 14 THE COURT: No, not at this time. 15 MR. DAWSON: Thank you, sir. 16 THE COURT: Mr. Graves? 17 MR. GRAVES: A couple of points if I may. I find it 18 very ironic that in the very motion to sever Zach Scruggs from 19 this case because of the inability -- one of our points is that 20 the jury, no matter what the curative instruction is, is not 21 going to be able to set aside what's before them. In the very 22 motion of that, when the Government concedes, it's not arguing 23 that 404(b) be included. 24 Most of the discussion and the argument is about the 25

what all the evidence is you plan on presenting -- I heard Mr. Norman say something about he doesn't -- he's not sure that somebody committed a crime in the Wilson case. And they don't have to charge -- they may not charge anybody because they're not sure it was a crime. Who is it that you're not sure committed the crime, I guess?

MR. DAWSON: Well, just for the sake of argument, you could argue that Judge DeLaughter made a decision that could be upheld, and that he -- there was a lack of evidence to show beyond a reasonable doubt that he actually was influenced in his decision. That does not mean that Dickie Scruggs, Joey Langston, and others didn't conspire to corruptly influence him. I think -- in fact, that's what Mr. Langston has pled guilty to.

THE COURT: So this -- I think Mr. Norman mentioned this morning that when Judge DeLaughter took a proposed order and showed it to Peters and Balducci and Langston, said, Is this okay with you -- basically what you're charging happened in this case with Judge Lackey. Are you saying that that's not sufficient to show --

21 MR. DAWSON: No, sir, I'm not. I will say to the 22 Court that that case is under active investigation. It is 23 under active investigation. It is under active investigation 24 by the Public Integrity Section of the United States Department 25 of Justice in Washington, D.C. even as we speak.

look at everything they provided us -- again, I'm working off

memory -- I don't think that Zach Scruggs' name is mentioned

404(b) evidence against Mr. Dick Scruggs. The fact is, if you

3 anywhere in those

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4 And this goes to the point, one of things I just heard, 5 quote, some evidence that might indicate some knowledge. And

6 we're talking about a person being tried under the United

7 States Constitution based on his knowledge, his intent; and the

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prejudice here, I think, is clear. 9

Fairness and prejudice is the standard that the Court gets to decide. I'm not suggesting that the Fifth Circuit has

11 demanded that you make a particular decision in this case. But

12 I certainly think that this is beyond the normal case. This

13 isn't two drug dealers, and one we've got a little more

14 evidence against him than we've got against the other.

15 This is the case where the distance between what is going 16 to be available, going back to the Wilson case, going through 17 all the evidence in this case, is enormous. And not only is

18 that distance the name is the same, you know, his father is on

19 trial; and the confusion between the 404(b) evidence, the name,

20 and everything. I think is a very real --

21 THE COURT: Well, Mr. Graves, do you consider now 22 that you have all of the evidence that they're going to 23 present? Do you have it in your -- you have knowledge of all

24 their evidence at this point?

MR. GRAVES: Well, Your Honor, obviously, I don't

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1	have all the Jencks evidence and everything in every matter.	1	Mr. Richard Scruggs, Your Honor.	
2	But I believe that the Government in good faith would	2	THE COURT: Well, Mr. Graves, what were you asking?	
3	acknowledge there may be some other things here or there, but	3	MR. GRAVES: Your Honor, we're asking for a severance	
4	that is basically what his involvement in this case comes down	4	from this case and	
5	to.	5	THE COURT: You want a severance also from Backstrom?	
6	And I think it really comes down to that November 1st	6	MR. GRAVES: That would be our position, Your Honor.	
7	tape. And that's something that was just spoken about a minute	7	THE COURT: Okay. Now, Mr. Trapp, you're only asking	
8	ago. And the thing again, if you're viewing this from the	8	for a severance from Richard Scruggs?	
9	lens of – if you know that there's a conspiracy and somebody	9	MR. TRAPP: That's correct, Your Honor.	
. 10	starts talking about sweet potatoes, that might mean something	10	THE COURT: Not from Zach Scruggs?	
11	for you. If you're in a room and someone comes in and delivers	11	MR. TRAPP: That's correct. Your Honor, the case	
12	a message, you've got things on your mind, this sweet potatoes	12	against Mr. Backstrom boils down to essentially four tapes,	
13	thing, and even if you heard it, it's a pretty odd thing.	13	those are October 18, 31, November 1, November 13. The	
14	If there was a true conspiracy and everyone was in on it,	14	credibility of Mr. Balducci I don't even believe the	
15	it'd be like it would be like Agent Delaney's testimony was.	15	Government would call Mr. Patterson after the Court grants the	
16	You still owe me ten grand; I owe the judge some money. Let's	16	severance, and we were tried separate.	
17	get this thing right and get this over with. It wouldn't be, I	17	And at trial against Mr. Backstrom and if the Court	
18	got to haul a load of sweet potatoes and this other gibberish.	18	included Zach Scruggs, Mr. Scruggs would be relatively short,	
19	From that moment on, you never hear Zach Scruggs' voice	19	right at a week, I believe, Your Honor. The only tape that	
20	again. There's no discussion. I don't know that the	20	they have referred to that they would want to use against	
21	Government can show he was in the room then. But whether he	21	Mr. Backstrom that has anything relating to Mr. Richard Scruggs	
22	was or he wasn't, he clearly wasn't in the room after that	22	is a November 1st tape, and that is easily separated because	
23	point. And I don't know that that shows any intent to join a	23	Balducci has the conversation that the Court has heard about	
24	conspiracy.	24	where neither what they didn't tell you is, I think, and	
25	And this other issue of perhaps they were earwigging the	25	to Mr. Zach Scruggs is leaving the office, which is	
		78		80
1	judge, perhaps they were doing things that were improper under	78	reflected.	80
1 2	judge, perhaps they were doing things that were improper under a bar standard, that's very different than a criminal standard.		reflected. And Mr. Backstrom having had a is reading from this	80
		1		80
2	a bar standard, that's very different than a criminal standard.	1 2	And Mr. Backstrom having had a is reading from this	80
2	a bar standard, that's very different than a criminal standard. That's a very different matter. And I don't know that proof	1 2 3	And Mr. Backstrom having had a is reading from this order that they presented to him, and then had some	80
2 3 4	a bar standard, that's very different than a criminal standard. That's a very different matter. And I don't know that proof that someone understands that an individual is earwigging a	1 2 3 4	And Mr. Backstrom having had a is reading from this order that they presented to him, and then had some conversation about the order they don't do anything with the	80
2 3 4 5	a bar standard, that's very different than a criminal standard. That's a very different matter. And I don't know that proof that someone understands that an individual is earwigging a judge – if that's the case, there are a few other law firms	1 2 3 4 5	And Mr. Backstrom having had a is reading from this order that they presented to him, and then had some conversation about the order they don't do anything with the proposed order from Judge Lackey. But he's reading into the	80
2 3 4 5 6	a bar standard, that's very different than a criminal standard. That's a very different matter. And I don't know that proof that someone understands that an individual is earwigging a judge — if that's the case, there are a few other law firms here in town that would suffer under that standard.	1 2 3 4 5 6	And Mr. Backstrom having had a is reading from this order that they presented to him, and then had some conversation about the order they don't do anything with the proposed order from Judge Lackey. But he's reading into the record on the tape and reading an order actually aloud as	80
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